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THE CHAPTER 13 ESTATE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
DAVID GRAY CARLSON• 
INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years into the life of the Bankruptcy Code, the courts still have no 
coherent theory of chapter 13. This is decidedly not their fault, as the text of the 
Bankruptcy Code virtually precludes a perfect theory. Every known theory of 
chapter 13 does violence to some part of the Bankruptcy Code. The choice is one 
between the lesser of evils. 
In this article, I set forth what I think is the best, most coherent theory of 
chapter 13. This theory is by no means new to me, though I will have some new 
things to say about it. The theory I defend goes by the undescriptive name of the 
"estate transformation" and has been adopted by a small number of courts. 1 The 
name is undescriptive and unattractive, so hereby re-christen it the "Divestment 
Theory" ("DT") because the crux of it is that confirmation of a chapter 13 plan 
divests (i.e., terminates) the chapter 13 estate in favor of the debtor. 
According to the DT, the bankruptcy petition creates a chapter 13 estate. Upon 
plan confirmation, the estate ends, except as to funds the debtor successfully 
transmits to the chapter 13 trustee for the benefit of creditors. Although the matter 
seems simple as I have stated it, the DT is in fact rife with controversy and 
theoretical conflict. Nevertheless, it is the theory that best accords with the 
language of the Bankruptcy Code. 
This article commences with the doctrinal justification for the DT. Part II 
addresses the difficulties it faces and tries to minimize them. The remainder of the 
article reviews the competing theories in specific contexts, and why these theories 
are less adequate than the DT. Part III concerns the automatic stay. Under the DT, 
confirmation of a chapter 13 plan greatly restricts the automatic stay, which curtails 
creditor enforcement once the bankruptcy petition is filed.2 Other theories manage 
to keep the automatic stay intact until the plan is completed, which is unfair to post-
petition creditors not entitled to distributions under the plan. There should be a 
connection between application of the automatic stay and entitlement to 
distributions under the plan. 
Part IV concerns inheritances and other windfalls debtors receive after the 
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Thanks to Jeanne Schroeder and Mitch Engler 
for helping me to theorize this article. · 
1 See Waldron v. Brown (In re Waldron), 536 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging court's 
adoption of"estate transformation approach ... to resolve the tension between [11 U.S.C.] sections 1306(a) 
and 1327(b)"); Peter Carpio & Jeffrey L. Cohen, Note, Modified Estate Transformation: When Does a 
Chapter 13 Estate Terminate?, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 213, 217-19 (1999) (discussing courts' three 
different applications of estate transformation approach). 
2 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). 
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bankruptcy petition. The DT places these beyond the bankruptcy estate. Other 
theories attempt to place these within the bankruptcy estate so they may be 
expropriated for creditors. This makes for bad chapter 13 theory and is also quite 
unnecessary. If inheritances and the like are disposable income, then creditors may 
recover them by modifying the confirmed plan, pursuant to section 1329(a)(l), 
whether or not they are in or dehors the bankruptcy estate. If they are not disposable 
income, it makes no difference to proclaim such property to be "property of the 
estate," as the debtor is entitled to possess "property of the estate," free and clear of 
the creditors. 
Part VI addresses whether a debtor has power of alienation in chapter 13. 
Under the DT, the debtor's power is restricted prior to confirmation of the plan and 
unrestricted thereafter. After confirmation, the debtor is free to alienate assets 
without court permission. Other theories disagree and have perpetrated some 
startling incidents of injustice. 
Part VII addresses a specific kind of asset in the chapter 13 estate: causes of 
action. I argue that the proper theory of chapter 13 permits the debtor to bring these 
causes of action, especially after confirmation of a plan. Furthermore, I argue that 
the debtor is empowered to enforce avoidance actions such as fraudulent 
conveyances and voidable preferences. This, I maintain, is required on the DT. 
Surprisingly, courts have missed the obvious syllogism that must be drawn between 
the theory of the chapter 13 estate, and the debtor standing to bring avoidance 
actions. 
Part VIII investigates the theory of the chapter 13 estate as it impacts 
exemptions. Many courts think exemptions in chapter 13 are irrelevant (once the 
plan is confirmed), since confirmation expels all assets (not just exempt assets) 
from the bankruptcy estate. I argue that this overlooks the fact that debtors have the 
power to avoid liens that impair these exemptions. These avoidance actions are 
highly relevant in chapter 13. 
Part IX addresses the ability of creditors to garnish property of the chapter 13 
estate, where the debtor is not the chapter 13 debtor, but rather some creditor of the 
chapter 13 debtor. For example, suppose the debtor's lawyer has not paid taxes. 
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") attempts to levy the chapter 13 trustee to 
capture the distributions the trustee owes to the lawyer. Here the debtor is the 
lawyer, not the chapter 13 debtor. Some of these garnishment cases have been 
influential in distorting the theory of the chapter 13 estate. I will show that 
garnishments can be administered correctly if the DT governs chapter 13 
jurisprudence. 
Finally, Part X considers the effect of converting a chapter 7 case to chapter 13. 
A proper theory of chapter 13 is vitally necessary to a proper theory of the 
converted chapter 7 case. I will show how some influential cases have reached the 
wrong result because of defective chapter 13 theory. 
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I. THE NATURE OF CHAPTER 13 ESTATE 
Relevant to the theory of the chapter 13 estate are five prov1s1ons of the 
Bankruptcy Code. First, section 541(a) describes the bankruptcy estate for all of the 
chapters. The grundnorm of section 541 is that a debtor's pre-petition property is in, 
while post-petition property is out, of the estate. For our purposes, two exceptions 
exist. The more important is section 541(a)(6), which expels any proceeds of the 
estate that are "earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the 
commencement of the case. "3 Another exception is section 541 (a)( 5), which brings 
inheritances, life insurance payouts, and divorce property settlements into the 
bankruptcy estate if obtained within 180 days after the bankruptcy petition.4 
The second Bankruptcy Code provision to be considered is the single greatest 
source of confusion in theorizing the chapter 13 estate. According to section 
1306(a): 
Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified 
in section 541 of this title-
(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that the 
debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but 
before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case 
under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs 
first; and 
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after 
the commencement of the case but before the case is closed 
dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 
of this title, whichever occurs first. 5 
This provision establishes that the chapter 13 estate exceeds the scope of the chapter 
7 estate, which is described by section '541(a) alone. Basically, section 1306(a) adds 
any post-petition property acquired by a debtor after the bankruptcy petition. 
The third provision for which a theory of chapter 13 must account is section 
1327(b), which provides: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or the order 
confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate 
in the debtor. "6 The interaction of section 1327(b) with section 1306(A) is the most 
controversial aspect of chapter 13 theory. According to the DT, section J306(a)(2) 
3 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(6) (2006). 
4 See In re Chenoweth, 3 F.3d 1111, 1112-13 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding debtor may not disclaim legacy if 
decedent has died within 180-day period). 
5 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2006). Is there any point to section 1306(a)(2), with regard to earnings, given 
section 1306(a)(l), which expropriates after-acquired property for the bankruptcy estate? The answer is no. 
Post-petition proceeds are themselves always after-acquired property, so subsection (a)(2) could have been 
omitted as redundant. 
6 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (2006). 
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and section 1327(b), when read together, mean that "while the filing of the petition 
for bankruptcy places all the property of the debtor Ill the control of the bankruptcy 
court, the plan upon confirmation returns so much of that property to the debtor's 
control as is not necessary to the fulfillment of the plan. "7 It would have been better 
if Congress had said that section 1327(b) operates notwithstanding section 1306(a), 
as the Bankruptcy Code so often does. 8 It also would have been better if Congress 
had stayed away from the word "vest." Courts, like first year property students, 
have been so confused by this word that they have, in their desperation, resorted to 
Black's Law Dictionary to figure out what it means, usually with unfortunate 
results.9 
A fourth provision is section 1326(a), which requires that the debtor pay 
disposable income to the chapter 13 trustee, even before a plan is confirmed. These 
funds constitute the chapter 13 estate, once the trustee receives the funds. 10 Only 
this part of the chapter 13 estate survives confirmation. 11 
The fifth and final provision (actually a group of provisions) governs 
conversion of the chapter 13 case to chapter 7. Conversion to chapter 7 pursuant to 
section 1307 is even more common than actual completion of the plan. 12 Ergo, a 
7 Black v. U.S. Postal Serv. (In re Heath), 115 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1997) (defining section 1306(a)(2) 
and section 1327(b)); see also In re Van Stelle, 354 B.R. 157, 170 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006) (finding 
"vesting" means "transfer"); In re Smith, 280 B.R. 436,440 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (stating "property of the 
debtor's estate ... revests in the debtor upon confirmation of a Chapter 13 Plan"). 
8 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(b), 109(a), 303(f), 362(e)(2), 502(d), 503(c), 505(c), 510(c), 52l(i)(l), 522(b)(l), 
523(b), 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), 548(e), 552(b)(l), 557(c)(l), 723(c), 1307(g), 1322(b)(4), 1326(d), 1328(d) (2006). 
9 See Woodard v. Taco Bueno Rests., Inc., No. 4:05-CV-804-Y, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89135, at *25 
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2006) (using Black's Law Dictionary to define "vest" for purposes of section 1327). 
10 See Barbosa v. Soloman, 235 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2000); Nash v. Kester (In re Nash), 765 F.2d 1410, 
1413 (9th Cir. 1985). Where the court has made an income order requiring an employer to pay wages 
directly to the chapter 13 trustee, the order brings the wage receivable into the chapter 13 estate even before 
wages are submitted to the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2006) ("After confirmation of a plan, the court 
may order any entity from whom the debtor receives income to pay all or any part of such income to the 
trustee."); In re McKnight, 136 B.R. 891, 892 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1992). The income order is, in effect, the 
trustee's garnishment lien on the debtor's wages. Where no such order is in place, however, only wages 
actually transmitted to the chapter 13 trustee are in the bankruptcy estate. See In re Thompson, 142 B.R. 961, 
964 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (holding "property of the estate consists only of those funds actually paid to the 
Chapter 13 Trustee" in case without court order). For a discussion of income deductions by debtor's 
employer per court order in chapter 13 cases, see generally 3 KEITH M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY 
§ 248.1 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2004). 
11 See In re Thompson, 142 B.R. at 963 (concluding estate after confirmation "consists of the property and 
future earnings of the debtor dedicated to fulfillment of the Chapter 13 Plan") ( quoting In re Root, 61 B.R. 
984, 985 (Bankr. Colo. 1986)). This aspect is probably why the bad name of "estate transformation" has been 
unhappily adopted. The estate, previously defined by section 1306(a), is "transformed" into the funds 
successfully conveyed by the debtor to the chapter 13 trustee. 
12 See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 493 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing failure rate 
between 37% and 60% for chapter 13 plans); In re Jemison, No. 07-40761, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3107, at *10 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. Sept. 6, 2007) (explaining majority oflocal confirmed chapter 13 plans never completed); 
Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt 
Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415,440 (1999) (stating one-third completion rate in 
Southern District of Mississippi); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer 
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theory of the chapter 13 estate must reconcile itself with the chapter 7 estate in case 
of conversion. According to section 348(±)(1), any property the debtor obtained 
since filing for bankruptcy belongs to the debtor alone. Putting momentarily to one 
side a confusing "bad faith" exception, 13 only property that the debtor possessed at 
the time of the petition, and still possesses, is transferred to the chapter 7 trustee. 14 
Synthesizing these ideas, the DT asserts the following: When a debtor files in 
chapter 13, all his pre-petition property goes into the bankruptcy estate. When the 
plan is confirmed, the bankruptcy estate is absolutely transferred back to the debtor. 
Funds the debtor has already paid or will continue to pay to the chapter 13 trustee 
are held in trust for the creditors whose rights are described in the plan. This is the 
only bankruptcy estate to survive confirmation. If the case converts to chapter 7, 
the debtor transfers all property that historically was property of the estate on the 
day of the bankruptcy petition. Any other property acquired after the bankruptcy 
petition is not part of the bankruptcy estate. 
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE THEORY 
A. Violence to Section J 306(a) 
The DT is not perfect. First and foremost, it does some violence to the 
language of section 1306(a), which puts after-acquired property into the chapter 13 
estate until the estate is "closed, dismissed, or converted .... "15 The challenge 
posed to the DT is that section 1306(a) contradicts the claim that confirmation of a 
plan is the point of estate termination. 
Now why does section 1306(a) exist? It ends up being rather hard to say. One 
might maintain that its principal function is the administration of the so-called "best 
interest of the creditors" test of section 1325(a)(4)16 -a vital component of the 
economic theory of chapter 13. According to section 1325(a)(4), a plan must pay 
every creditor at least as much as the creditor would have received in a chapter 7 
Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 397,411 (1994) (reporting completion rate 31 %). 
13 See infra text accompanying note 99-101. 
14 11 U.S.C. § 348(t)(l)(A) (2006) provides: 
Except as provided in paragraph (2), when a case under chapter 13 of this title is 
converted to a case under another chapter under this title -
(A) property of the estate in the converted case shall consist of property of 
the estate, as of the date of filing of the petition, that remains in the 
possession of or is under the control of the debtor on the date of 
conversion[.] 
15 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(l) (2006). 
16 Accord In re Fisher, 198 B.R. 721, 732-33 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) ("[J]ust as in the situation with 
conversion, the continuing role of the estate in Chapter 13, under the best interest test, requires that the estate 
be protected."), rev'd, 203 B.R. 958 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). 
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liquidation accomplished "on such date"-on the date the plan becomes effective. 
This is the provision that establishes the "Pareto superiority" of chapter 13 over 
chapter 7. The economic idea of chapter 13 ( and of the other reorganization 
chapters as well) is that every creditor must be at least as well off under the plan as 
in a hypothetical liquidation of assets at the time the plan is confirmed. 
Seemingly, one might say that section 1306(a) is a necessary component for 
making the "best interest of the creditors" test work. Accordingly, the bankruptcy 
estate must be enhanced by property obtained between the bankruptcy petition and 
the confirmation hearing so that the hypothetical liquidation test "on this date" can 
be effectively administered. 17 
This account of section 1306(a), however, must fail. Notice how section 
1325(a)(4) sets forth the test: 
[T]he value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be 
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured 
claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim 
if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this 
title on such date. 18 
Section 1325(a)(4) indicates that we are to value the debtor's property-not 
property of the estate-as of the effective date of the plan. This, by the way, is 
indirect evidence that confirmation of the plan terminates the chapter 13 estate, 
since liquidation of the debtor's property is invoked as of the effective date of the 
plan. The point here is that, since we are to value the debtor's property at the time 
of confirmation, the "best interest of the creditors" test operates whether or not 
section 1306(a) brings the debtor's post-petition acquisitions into the bankruptcy 
estate. 
Chapter 11 has no equivalent to section 1306(a), yet the principle is implicit in 
chapter 11 nevertheless. This must be so because, in chapter 11 as well as in 
chapter J3, the "best interest of the creditors" test is performed as of the time the 
plan becomes effective.19 Such a test requires that the bankruptcy estate be 
enhanced by acquisitions after the bankruptcy petition and before confirmation. 
Yet, section 1141(b) is thought to terminate the bankruptcy estate. If that is the rule 
17 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(4) (2006) (providing "court shall confirm a plan if ... the value, as of effective 
date of plan, of property to be distributed" is not less than liquidated value of estate as of such date). 
Nevertheless, Judge Keith Lundin reports that most reported opinions assume that date of the bankruptcy 
petition is the date as of which the test must be performed. LUNDIN, supra note 10, at§ 160.2; see also In re 
Green, 169 B.R. 480, 482 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) (interpreting "effective date of the plan" as date petition 
was filed). · 
18 II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (emphasis added). 
19 See 11 U.S.C. § l 129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2006) (providing "court shall confirm a plan ... if ... with respect to 
each impaired class of claims or interests," each holder has accepted such plan or will receive or retain such 
amount, effective as date of plan, not less than amount each holder would retain or receive under 
liquidation). 
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in chapter 11, it must also be the rule in chapter 13. 20 
If the principle of section 1306(a) is inherent in chapter 11 cases, then could 
section 1306(a) have been left out of chapter 13 altogether? Chapter B's version of 
the "best interest of the creditors" test refers to the value of "the estate of the debtor" 
as of the confirmation date-not the bankruptcy estate. Properly, the "best interest 
of the creditors" test could be conducted even if section 1306(a) did not exist. So, 
what is the function of section 1306(a) again? I see only two practical effects. 
Because section 1306(a) makes post-petition property part of the chapter 13 estate, 
the debtor must seek court permission to use estate assets out of the ordinary course 
of business. According to section 1303, "the debtor shall have, exclusive of the 
trustee, the rights and powers of a trustee under [section] 363(b)."21 A trustee may 
use estate property out of the ordinary course of business only with court 
perm1ss1on. Therefore, section 1306(a) puts post-petition property under the 
tutelage of the bankruptcy court until such time as the plan is confirmed. It also 
activates the automatic stay against post-petition creditors (but only in the pre-
confirm1;1.tion period).22 In general, section 1306(a) compensates for the fact that, in 
chapter 13, the debtor is not the trustee, as she is- in chapter 11.23 By virtue of 
section 1306(a), the debtor is made a fiduciary for the creditors-at least until the 
plan is confirmed. 
Under the DT, the bankruptcy estate is transferred to the debtor when a plan is 
confirmed. But section 1306(a) brings after-acquired property into the chapter 13 
estate until the case is "closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 
11, or 12 .... "24 How can the chapter 13 estate come to an end upon confirmation 
of a plan, when section 1306(a) includes adequate protection payments in the 
chapter 13 estate until the case is closed? A chapter 13 case does not close just 
because a plan is confirmed. Only if the plan is completed can the case be closed.25 
20 See In re Gyulafia, 65 B.R. 913, 917 (Banla. D. Kan. 1986) ("Sections 1327(b) and (c) are identical to 
sections 114l(b) and (c)."). Some courts think that section 1306(a) adds a principle to chapter 13 that 
otherwise would not be there. See In re Fisher, 198 B.R. at 726 (determining post-petition provision would 
not be applicable and post-petition earnings of debtor would not be property of estate) (citing Bobroff v. 
Continental Bank (In re Bobroft), 766 F.2d 797, 802-03 (3d Cir.1985))); see also In re Thompson, 142 B.R. 
961, 964 (Banla. D. Colo. 1992) (recognizing some courts find section 1327(b) to be identical to section 
l141(b), while no section has been found comparable to 1306(2)). 
21 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006). 
22 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2)-(4) (2006). 
23 See 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006). 
24 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2) (2006). 
25 See In re Ball, No. 06-1002, 2008 Banla. LEXIS 1532, at *7 (Banla. N.D. W. Va. May 23, 2008) 
("Chapter 13 cases are not closed until after all plan payments have been made and a discharge entered."); 
see also In re Avery, 272 B.R. 718, 726-27 (Banla. E.D. Cal. 2002) (requiring trustee to prove estate has 
been fully administered before case can be closed). Section 1302(b)(l) requires a chapter 13 trustee to 
"perform the duties specified in section[] ... 704(9)." 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(l). And section 704(a)(9) 
commands the chapter 7 trustee to "make a final report and file a final account of the administration of the 
estate with the court and with the United States trustee." 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(9) (2006). According to section 
350(a), "[a]fter an estate is fully administered and the court has discharged the trustee, the court shall close 
the case." 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) (2006). 
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Furthermore, a plan might be confirmed before the case is dismissed or converted to 
chapter 7.26 So section 1306(a) already accounts for the possibility of confirmation 
and yet still says broadly that all property acquired after the bankruptcy is property 
of the estate. 
The theory I am defending depends upon the premise that section 1327(b) 
supersedes section 1306(a), even though section 1327(b) fails to use the words 
"notwithstanding section 1306(a). "27 It is often noted that these two provisions are 
in conflict.28 A choice must be made as to which statute predominates. In such 
moments, courts utilize an interpretive canon-the specific outranks the general. 29 
To quote the ancient wisdom of the Supreme Court: 
[W]here there is, in the same statute, a particular enactment, and 
also a general one, which, in its most comprehensive sense, would 
include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment 
must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to 
affect only such cases within its general language as are not within 
the provisions of the particular enactment.30 
The choice of section 1327(b) over section 1306(a) follows this interpretive rule. 
If section 1327(b) predominates, section 1306(a) still has utility in the pre-
confirmation period. But if section 1306(a) predominates section 1327(b) has no 
utility at all. Suppose we imagine that the bankruptcy estate does not end at 
confirmation, as some courts assert. This is consistent with section 1327(b) so, the 
argument goes, because section 1327(b) does not say that the bankruptcy estate 
abandons the bankruptcy estate to the debtor.31 It does not say that it transfers the 
bankruptcy estate to the debtor. Rather, it says that confirmation "vests all . . . 
property of the estate in the debtor. "32 Supposedly, it is possible to view "vest" as 
not being the same concept as "absolute transfer. "33 Rather, it is possible to assert 
that "vest" means that the debtor has a present possessory estate and the bankruptcy 
26 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6) (2006) (indicating material default in plan is grounds for dismissal or 
conversion). 
27 See Carpio & Cohen, supra note l, at 214 ("The conflict concerning what constitutes 'property of the 
estate' turns on whether the vesting provision of section 1327(b) ends the bankruptcy estate notwithstanding 
the decree of section 1306(a), which states that the estate accrues only until closure, dismissal, or conversion 
of the case."). 
28 See Waldron v. Brown (In re Waldron), 536 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2008); Telfair v. First Union 
Mortgage Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Harchar, 371 B.R. 254, 264 (N.D. 
Ohio2007). 
29 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,267 (1981). 
30 United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255,260 (1890). 
31 Cf 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (2006) ("[A]ny property ... not otherwise administered at the time of the closing 
of a case is abandoned to the debtor and administered for purposes of section 350 .... "). 
32 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (2006). 
33 See In re Kolenda, 212 B.R. 851, 854 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1997) (holding "vest" need not mean 
"transfer"). 
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trustee has a future interest. 
To an estates lawyer, "vest" means "meet the terms of a condition precedent. "34 
It does not necessarily mean, for example, "take possession of." A contingent 
remainder might become a vested remainder when a condition precedent is met, yet 
the remainder is not a possessory interest.35 Sometimes vesting and possession 
coincide, as when a condition subsequent divests a present possessory estate in 
favor of a future interest holder, who both vest and takes possession simultaneously. 
Possession, however, is not logically necessary to the concept of vesting.36 
In chapter 13, prior to confirmation, a debtor already has the right to possess the 
bankruptcy estate. 37 What then does "vesting" add? The opposing theory has no 
answer to this. 
My answer is that "vesting" is a clumsy way of saying "transferring 
absolutely. "38 Otherwise, "vesting" means nothing at all. 
34 See Christian v. County of Ontario, 399 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (Sup. Ct. 1977) ("'vested right' expresses 
concept of present fixed interest."). 
35 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY§ 239 (1936) (stating "[w]hen succeeding interest is subject to 
condition precedent ... upon the fulfillment of condition precedent, becomes ... a vested future interest if 
all such prior interests have not ended."). 
36 See In re Chenoweth, 3 F.3d 1111, 1113 (7th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging "marked distinction between ... 
vesting of an estate and the right to enjoy possession of that estate"). 
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (stating "debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the ystate"). In 
arguing that section 1327(b) does not terminate the chapter 13 estate, the court in In re Thompson remarks: 
If there is no longer any property of the estate upon confirmation, then§ 1306(b) 
has no meaning. That subsection can have no applicability until confirmation, and if at 
that time there is no more property of the estate then there is no reason to grant the 
debtor possession of such nonexistent property of the estate. 
142 B.R. 961, 964 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992). On this view, vesting means possession, and the debtor has no 
possessory right prior to confirmation. Everyone agrees that the debtor has a possessory right prior to 
confirmation. What section 1306(a) seems to be saying is that, prior to confirmation, the debtor may possess 
property of the estate, but the plan, when confirmed, may dispossess the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b )(9) 
(stating "plan may ... provide for the vesting of property of the estate, on confirmation of the plan ... in the 
debtor or in any other entity"). Inconsistently, the Thompson court goes on to state that only dollars 
successfully transmitted to the chapter 13 trustee are property of the estate after confirmation. 142 B.R. at 
944. Therefore, a post-petition creditor may levy wages without fear of the automatic stay. 
38 See In re McKnight, 136 B.R. 891, 894 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1992) ("'Vest' as a legal term means to obtain 
the character or given the rights of absolute ownership"); see also In re O'Brien, 181 B.R. 71, 74 (Bankr. D. 
Ariz. 1995) (finding at time of confirmation term "vests ... must mean that the bankruptcy estate generally 
ceases to exist, and the debtor has sole ownership, control, and enjoyment of the property"). Can we say that 
the transfer to the debtor under section 1327(b) is analogous to abandonment under section 554? 11 U.S.C. § 
554 ("[T]rustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of 
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate."). Judge David Scholl ruled against this interpretation in In re 
Clark, 71 B.R. 747 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.1987). In his view, the estate, under the DT, "disappears." Id. at 749 
(determining when plan is confirmed, "'property of the estate,' vesting in the Debtor, is 'property of the estate' 
no more"). Disappearance is like abandonment, in that, in effect, an abandoning bankruptcy trustee 
renounces the judicial lien on assets of the debtor, leaving the pre-petition owners as they were before the 
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (providing "trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is 
burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate"). Judge Scholl 
remarked, "[w]hen it is considered at more length, it can be concluded that § 1327(b) raises additional 
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Solid proof that "to· vest" means "to transfer absolutely" can be found in 
Bankruptcy Code section 349(b)(3), which states that dismissal of a bankruptcy 
case "revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was 
vested immediately before the commencement of the case under th(s title. "39 This 
enactment as applied to ordinary debtor property assumes that, just prior to the 
bankruptcy petition, the debtor is vested with property.40 Therefore, when section 
1327(b) "vests" the debtor with property of the estate, the debtor returns to the state 
of ownership she had prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy.41 In short, the 
bankruptcy estate transfers all of its rights to the debtor. "Vesting" and "absolute 
transfer" are synonymous. 
As further proof, consider that chapter 11 has its version of section 1327(b). 
According to section 1141(b): "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or the 
order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the 
estate in the debtor. "42 In chapter 11, "confirmation usually terminates the existence 
of the estate."43 Yet, if "vest" does not mean "absolute transfer," then the bankruptcy 
estate survives confirmation in chapter 11. But no one believes this to be so. 
The DT compromises the broad language of section 1306(a) by limiting its 
effectiveness to the pre-confirmation period. But the opposing view--confirmation 
does not terminate the bankruptcy estate-entirely consigns section 1327(b) to the 
memory hole, so that section 1306(a) reigns supreme. If the DT impinges upon the 
scope of section 1306(a), at least section 1306(a) has a function-to govern the pre-
confirmation period. The opposing theory-the bankruptcy estate never ceases to 
exist in spite of plan confirmation-gives absolutely no function to section 1327(b) 
and is equally guilty of declaring that one section of the Bankruptcy Code outranks 
the other. 
conceptual questions, notably ... : If 'property of the estate' effectively disappears at confirmation, is it not 
improper to state that it 'vests' anywhere?" In re Clark, 71 B.R at 749. This is indeed the problem with the 
analogy to abandonment. Instead "vesting" must mean a transfer of the trustee's hypothetical judicial lien 
and/or bona fide purchase of real estate to the debtor. This merges with the debtor's residual equity 
ownership in the bankruptcy estate to become an absolute interest completely divorced from the bankruptcy 
estate. See generally David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 549, 
613-15 (1999) [hereinafter Carlson, Organizing Principle] (discussing theory of bankruptcy abandonment). 
39 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) (2006). 
40 See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 5787, 5835 ("the 
basic purpose of [section 349(b)] is to undo the bankruptcy case, as far as is practicable, and to restore all 
property rights to the position in which there were found at the commencement of the case"); West Va. State 
Tax Dep't v. Mullins (In re Mullins), No. CV 09-0974-TJH (JEM), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90691, at **14-
15 n.4 (S.D. W. Va. September 30, 2009). 
41 See In re Toth, 193 B.R. 992, 996-97 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) ("[I]fthe 'vesting' provided for in§ 1327 
does not act to end the [bankruptcy] estate, then§ 1327 becomes redundant and the term 'vest' is deprived of 
an.(2 meaning separate from 'possession' ... Therefore, 'vest' must mean something more than 'possession. 111). 
2 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (2006). 
43 Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers' Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581, 587 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Frank R. 
Kennedy & Gerald K. Smith, Postconfirmation Issues: The Effects of Confirmation and Postconfirmation 
Proceedings, 44 S.C. L. REV. 621, 743 (1993). 
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B. Violence to Converted Chapter 7 Scheme 
The DT also does some minor violence to the chapter 7 estate of a case 
converted from chapter 13. According to the DT, property is transferred absolutely 
to the debtor upon confirmation.44 The debtor pays for this transfer by dedicating 
projected disposable income to the creditor for the duration of the plan. When the 
case converts after confirmation, the debtor's property is conveyed back afresh to 
the chapter 7 trustee. But not all of the debtor's property goes into the chapter 7 
estate. According to section 348( f)(l ), only property that the debtor still possesses 
and that was, historically, property of the estate at the time of the bankruptcy 
petition is transferred back to the chapter 7 estate.45 
If this is so, how is it that conversion "does not effect a change in the date of the 
filing of the petition"?46 Admittedly, this timing rule coheres with the idea that a 
chapter 13 estate exists continuously from the time of the bankruptcy petition and 
running past confirmation to the time that the case is converted to chapter 7. 
Nevertheless, a theory that asserts the discontinuity of the bankruptcy estate (caused 
by conversion of a plan) is also a viable theory, in spite of this embarrassment. 47 
Under the DT, the automatic stay applies to any creditor with a pre-petition 
claim against the debtor.48 It does not apply to a post-petition creditor, because, 
according to the DT, there is no "property of the estate" after the plan is 
confirmed.49 Therefore, it is open for a post-petition creditor to obtain a judicial lien 
on the debtor's property without violating the stay. 
If, after such a lien attaches to the debtor's property, the case is converted, the 
lien is valid in the chapter 7 case. It is not a voidable preference, because, 
44 See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the 
plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor."). · 
45 See 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(l)(A) (2006) ("[P]roperty of the estate in the converted case shall consist of 
property of the estate, as of the date filing of the petition, that remains in the possession of or is under the 
control of the debtor on the date of conversion .... "). 
46 11 U.S.C. § 348(a). 
47 See In re Krick, 373 B.R. 593, 606 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2007) ("There is an inherent inconsistency between 
§ 348(f)(l)(A)'s 'relation back' to the date of the petition and the 're-vesting' provision of 11 U.S.C. § 
1327(b)."). Section 348(f)(l) dates only from 1994. How did post-confirmation conversions work prior to 
1994? Judge Wedoff argues that the bankruptcy estate must continue past confirmation because, otherwise, 
there is no explanation of how the debtor conveys anything to the chapter 7 trustee. See In re Fisher, 198 
B.R. 721, 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) ("If, after confirmation, there is no property in the Chapter 13 estate, 
this new provision would be absurd: it would provide, in cases of bad faith conversion of a Chapter 13 case 
after confirmation, that the estate in converted case is composed of nothing."), rev'd, 203 B.R. 958 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1997). In fact, prior to 1984, courts managed to find that all pre-petition property of the debtor was 
property of the chapter 7 estate, even if section 1327(b) is read as making the debtor the absolute owner of 
what was once property of the estate. See generally Michaela M. White, The Effects of Chapter 13 Plan 
Confirmation and Case Conversion on Property, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 785, 813-21 (1993) (discussing 
different courts' treatment of chapter 7 estates for pre-petition property of debtor before and after 1984). 
48 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(5}-(6) (2006). 
49 Except for the property the chapter 13 trustee controls pursuant to section 1326(a) or the terms of the 
plan. 
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according to section 348(a), the original chapter 13 petition governs, and the lien is 
a post-petition transfer. Nor does section 549(a) apply to avoid the lien. Section 
549 allows the trustee to avoid "a transfer of property of the estate" that occurs after 
the bankruptcy petition is filed. 50 Per the DT, the judicial lien is a transfer of debtor 
property, not property of the estate. Therefore, the post-confirmation lien ( or any 
other transfer) is good against the chapter 7 trustee in a converted case.51 The 
discontinuity in the bankruptcy estate (in converted cases) may not be the DT's most 
elegant moment, but it functions well enough. 
C. Change of Theory By Means of a Plan Term or Confirmation Order 
Oddly, section 1322(b )(9) invites debtors to write a plan term that prevents the 
vesting of estate property in the debtor. 52 Accordingly, a plan may "provide for the 
vesting of property of the estate, on confirmation of the plan or at a later time, in the 
debtor or in any other entity."53 And section 1327(b) operates "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan. "54 These two provisions 
suggest that, whatever the proper theory of the chapter 13 estate may be, either the 
debtor (in the plan) or the court (in a confirmation order) may simply change it. 
Such a plan term extends the automatic stay against property of the estate.55 
Why then don't debtors routinely write such plan terms, in order to extend the 
automatic stay?56 Under the theory being defended, debtors are vulnerable to post-
petition creditors, who are not subject to the automatic stay once the plan is 
confirmed. If their plans prevented vesting of property in the debtor, the automatic 
stay would then protect the property because, nominally, it is estate property. Not 
much would be lost. In case of conversion to chapter 7, the plan term has no effect 
on what a debtor must surrender to the chapter 7 estate. Section 348(£)(1) makes 
clear that the debtor may keep "property of the estate" if it was acquired post-
petition. On the other hand, the debtor would have to seek court permission before 
using or selling anything after plan confirmation. 57 
Some courts have found a repeal of section 1327(b) by the plan to be in bad 
taste, if the goal is merely to extend the automatic stay for the life of the plan.58 Yet 
50 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(l) (2006). 
51 See Still v. Rossville Bank (In re Chattanooga Wholesale Antiques, Inc.), 930 F.2d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 
1994). 
52 See, e.g., SouthTrust Bank of Alabama v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 883 F.2d 991, 993 (11th Cir. 1989); In 
re Coker, 216 B.R. 843, 846 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997); In re Lambright, 125 B.R. 733, 735 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
1991). 
53 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(9) (2006). 
54 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (providing exception to effect of confirmation). 
55 See In re Thongta, 401 B.R. 363, 365, 367--68 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009). 
56 See In re Vannordstrand, No. KS-05-091, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 210, at **6-7 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Jan. 31, 
2007) (debtor's plan provided for deferred vesting). · 
57 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(l)(B) (2006). 
58 See, e.g., In re Segura, No. 08-14280, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 460, at *27 (Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 9, 2009) 
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section 1327(b) specifically invites just this.59 At least one court has imposed such a 
plan term by means of a confirmation order.60 Such an override of the plan by 
means of a confirmation order (without the debtor's freely given consent) would 
seem to violate that shortest of United States Code sections, section 1321: "The 
debtor shall file a plan."61 Meanwhile, something is rotten in the Denmark of 
chapter 13 if one court imposes upon a debtor against his will the very provision 
that another court condemns as inappropriate. 
If indeed a plan may simply change the theory of the chapter 13 estate, or if a 
court can simply repeal section 1327(b) by preserving the bankruptcy estate in a 
confirmation order, perhaps not much is at stake in theorizing the chapter 13 estate. 
At best, the theory becomes a default term-it governs unless a court order says 
otherwise. 
The fact that the plan or a confirmation order can simply change the theory of 
the chapter 13 estate casts doubt on the very project of theorizing the bankruptcy 
estate. Yet, many substantive issues are decided by the prevailing theory, in cases 
where the plan and the confirmation order are silent as to whether property of the 
estate vests in the debtor upon confirmation of a plan. As the "Coase Theorem" 
teaches, who cares about the law if the law can be overridden by free wi11?62 
Can a court change the theory of the bankruptcy estate over the opposition of a 
(refusing plan confirmation where terms vested unnecessary assets for plan funding in estate); In re Jemison, 
No. 07-40761, 2007 Banlcr. LEXIS 3107, at *20 (Banlcr. N.D. Ala. Sept. 6, 2007) (finding congressional 
intent against extending automatic stay by this means). 
59 The Jemison court suggested that a proper purpose is to cover property specifically needed to fund the 
plan. 2007 Banlcr. LEXIS 3107 at ** 11-12, **20-21 ("It would presumably be an abuse of discretion for the 
banlcruptcy judge to confirm a plan that retained more property in the hands of the trustee than was 
reasonably necessary to fulfill the plan .... " (citing Black v. U.S. Postal Service (In re Heath), 115 F.3d 521, 
524 (7th Cir. 1997)) ). 
60 In re Fatsis, 396 B.R. 579, 580, 582-83 (Banlcr. D. Mass. 2008) (finding debtor violated confirmation 
order prohibiting him from alienating his real property before being discharged), ajj'd, 405 B.R. l(B.A.P. 1st 
Cir. 2009). 
61 See, e.g., In re Cohen, 305 B.R. 886, 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) ("[U]nlike in chapter 11, only the debtor 
can propose or modify a plan before confirmation." (citing 11. U.S.C. §§ 1321 & 1323(a) (2006))). Courts 
apparently feel free to supplement the debtor's plan with terms the debtor does not want. See In re Brumm, 
344 B.R. 795, 797 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006) (upholding confirmation order requiring annual income 
statement disclosures by debtor despite absence in plan confirmation); see also In re Profit, 283 B.R. 567, 
570 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (noting confirmation order required debtor to surrender tax refunds); In re 
Midgley, 413 B.R. 820, 821-22 (Banlcr. D. Or. 2009) (highlighting confirmation order requiring debtor 
report greater income than required under Schedule I); In re Forte, 341 B.R. 859, 865-66 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2005) (holding confirmation order negated section 1327(b) effect vesting estate in debtor). 
62 More precisely, the "Coase Theorem" holds that in a universe with no transaction costs, who the heck 
cares what the law is. But, in a universe where transactions are costly, who the heck knows what is going on. 
See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Commentary, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 521 (1998) ("[I]n a perfect world without transaction costs, it does not matter how 
the law allocates entitlements because people will always contract to reallocate entitlements in an 
economically efficient manner."); see also RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 15 
( 1988) (" Another consequence of the assumption of zero transaction costs, not usually noticed, is that, when 
there are no costs of making transactions it costs nothing to speed them up, so that eternity can be 
experienced in a second."). 
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debtor? There is reason to believe there are some limits on a court's power to 
. 63 impose terms a debtor doesn't want. In Anderson v. Satterlee (In re Anderson), a 
bankruptcy court refused to confirm a plan unless the debtor agreed to pay actual 
(not projected) disposable income. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 
the bankruptcy court could not condition confirmation of a plan on requirements not 
to be found in section 1325(b)(l).64 While the case involved a refusal to confirm 
(instead of a confirmation with onerous terms added over the opposition of the 
debtor), the case would seem to stand against the use of confirmation orders to 
require things that the debtor actually opposes.65 It has occasionally been held that a 
court may not impose plan terms on the debtor with which the debtor disagrees.66 
Ergo, there is some reason to believe that a court cannot use the confirmation order 
as a means to change the theory of the chapter 13 estate that Congress has adopted, 
even if section 1327(b) invites an override by means of the confirmation order. At 
best, the confirmation order must achieve what the debtor legitimately wants, free 
of coercion by the court or trustee. 
To summarize, though the DT is not perfect, it wreaks less damage upon the 
black letter of the Bankruptcy Code than the other theories. It does assert that 
section 1327(b) overrules section 1306(a) once the plan is confirmed. It requires a 
theory of the converted chapter 7 case whereby an interruption exists between 
confirmation of the chapter 13 plan and converting the case-a concept that causes 
no real difficulty. It requires a leap of faith that courts are not simply free to write 
their own theory of the chapter 13 estate if they disfavor the one actually legislated 
by Congress. 
The next several sections examine the question of the chapter 13 estate in 
various functional contexts. I will also examine the motives courts have for 
deviating from the DT, and whether in fact the courts really needed to deviate from 
it. I also examine how courts get around the statement of section 1327(b), which 
establishes some sort of transfer from the bankruptcy estate to the debtor-in my 
view, an absolute transfer. 
63 21 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994). 
64 Id at 356. 
III. THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
65 See In re Reed, No. 03-40669-7, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2337, at *2, * 18 (Bankr. D. Kan. July 9, 2007) 
(holding post-confirmation order tax refunds are not assets under converted chapter 7 estates). 
66 In re Cassell, 119 B.R. 89, 94-95 (W.D. Va. 1990). Nor may the trustee modify the plan without court 
approval. In System & Services Tech., Inc. v. Davis (In re Davis), 314 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2002), a secured 
creditor claiming a car was bifurcated by the plan. The debtor defaulted on paying wages to the chapter 13 
trustee. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay so that the collateral could be repossessed. The chapter 13 
trustee unilaterally decided that the car soon to be repossessed equaled the amount of shortfall on the secured 
claim. Therefore, together with payments earlier received under the plan, the trustee deemed the secured 
claim was entirely satisfied. The bankruptcy court gave a discharge of the secured claim on this basis. This, 
however, was reversed. A discharge can be given only if the plan is completed. As written, the plan was not 
completed. The trustee's unilateral "modification" of the plan could not be recognized. Id. at 569-71. 
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Under the DT, confirmation of a chapter 13 plan does not quite spell the end of 
the automatic stay. It continues to have a narrow sort of existence. It still prohibits 
"any act to create ... or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent 
that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case ... 
• "
67 It also prohibits "any act to collect ... a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case . . . . "68 These aspects of the automatic stay 
continue until the debtor is granted or denied a discharge. 69 
In all other respects, confirmation of a chapter 13 plan terminates the automatic 
stay. In particular, neither the debtor nor her property is spared from claims that 
arose after the bankruptcy petition was filed.70 Therefore, a post-petition creditor 
might garnish the very wages from an employer that a chapter 13 trustee expects to 
receive from the debtor.71 
Some courts believe that, since wages are typically necessary to execute the 
plan, garnishment of wages is prohibited. That is to say, that part of the wages 
necessary to execute the plan is "property of the estate." Therefore, the automatic 
stay works to protect at least this part of the debtor's right to be paid under an 
executory employment contract.72 
This theory palpably does not work. A debtor's "job" is an executory contract-
property of the estate when the debtor files for bankruptcy.73 Section 1306(a) 
67 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (2006). 
68 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). 
69 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C). 
70 See Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1340 (I Ith Cir. 2000) (holding stay was not 
violated when lender debited escrow account for post-petition attorneys' fees); In re Fisher, 203 B.R. 958, 
964 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding no stay violation where city destroyed debtor's car after property vested and 
was no longer protected by stay); Shell Oil Co. v. Capital Fin. Servs., 170 B.R. 903, 905-06 (S.D. Tex. 1994) 
(reporting liens secured by IRS against debtor's property did not violate stay because they occurred post-
petition); In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990) (determining stay not violated where IRS 
sought to collect post-petition debt from debtor's property); In re Walker, 84 B.R. 888, 889 (Bankr. D.D.C. 
1988) (holding stay not violated for collection of post-petition condominium fees owed by debtor); In re 
Johnson, 51 B.R. 439,442 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (rejecting stay violation where debtor filed complaint after 
confirmation of wife's plan). An exception of a sort can be found in section 1305(a), which permits creditors 
to file post-petition proofs of claim for a narrow range of claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2006). 
71 See In re Mason, 51 B.R. 548, 550 (D. Or. 1985) (holding garnishment by post-confirmation creditor did 
not violate stay). 
72 See In re Leavell, 190 B.R. 536, 540 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (finding post-petition earnings are protected 
by stay from post-confirmation creditors since they are property of estate); In re Ziegler, 136 B.R. 497, 500 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding segment of post-confirmation income necessary to fund plan becomes 
property of estate, while remainder of income becomes debtor's individual property); In re Adams, 12 B.R. 
540, 542 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (acknowledging that wages exceeding funds necessary to execute plan 
become debtor's property). 
73 In: chapter 7 cases, proceeds of the job are expelled from the bankruptcy estate, but the job is still in the 
estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6). As to this oddity, see In re Gyulafia, 65 B.R. 913, 917 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
1986) (holding post-petition tax claims must be filed under 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(l), not as administrative 
expense under 11 U.S.C § 503(b)). Executory contracts must be assumed with court approval under 
Bankruptcy Code section 365(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006) ("[T]he trustee, subject to the court's 
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract."). But, debtors are invited to write plan terms that 
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captures all pre-confirmation wages and makes them part of the chapter 13 estate. 
But, all this (including the job) is transferred absolutely to the debtor, under the DT 
reading of section 1327(b). Only those wages the debtor successfully pays to the 
chapter 13 trustee are property of the post-confirmation chapter 13 estate. 
Under the DT, post-petition creditors are free to levy on any property of a 
chapter 13 debtor, once a plan is confirmed. In Annese v. Kolenda (In re 
Kolenda),74 a debtor acquired a post-confirmation car and later granted a post-
confirmation security interest on that car. 75 The secured creditor repossessed and 
sold the car. 76 This was held to violate an expanded automatic stay. The reason why 
was that section 1327(b) never terminates the chapter 13 estate because the word 
"vest" does not mean "transfer absolutely."77 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code requires 
precisely what some judges found to be in bad faith when plans deferred all vesting 
of estate property in the debtor until the plan was complete. 78 From the perspective 
of the DT, this result is manifestly wrong. 
IV. PROPERTY INHERITED AFTER CONFIRMATION ORIGINAL 
Under the DT, a debtor who inherits property after confirmation of the plan gets 
to keep the inheritance while the creditors remain unpaid. I maintain that this is an 
important part of the basic chapter 13 bargain that is plain on the face of the 
Bankruptcy Code. According to this bargain, the debtor buys back property of the 
estate (valued as of the time of the confirmation hearing) in exchange for post-
petition disposable income. The requirement of paying all disposable income is 
adjustable. Under section 1329(a)(l), a plan can be modified (at the behest of the 
trustee or unsecured creditor) to increase or decrease payments of disposable 
income.79 So, if a debtor obtains post-confirmation property, it can be obtained if it 
is income. Otherwise, the basic chapter 13 bargain requires that the debtor keeps all 
estate property (including post-confirmation inheritances). 
Lottery winnings, for example, are income. These may be captured in plan 
modification. 80 Proceeds from selling a house are income to the extent of a net 
assume executory contracts and leases. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(7) (2006). Confirmation of the plan 
therefore equates with court approval of assumption of the debtor's contract. An issue that has never been 
considered is whether a debtor can "cure" and reinstate her job if fired before the bankruptcy petition. But, 
this thought cannot be pursued here. 
74 212 B.R. 851 (W.D. Mich. 1997). 
75 Id. at 853. 
76 Id. 
77 Accord In re Henry, 143 B.R. 811, 814 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992). 
78 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55, 57-58. 
79 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(l) (2006). 
80 See In re Koonce, 54 B.R. 643, 644--45 (Banlcr. D. S.C. 1985) (determining lottery winning acquired by 
debtor after commencement of chapter 13 case, but before case was "closed, dismissed, or converted," 
constituted income and therefore, subject to plan modification under section 1329(a) of Bankruptcy Code). 
2009] THE CHAPTER 13 ESTATE 249 
capital gain.81 An inheritance is not income, according to the Internal Revenue 
Code. 82 The better view is that bankruptcy law must not borrow its definition of 
income from the politically compromised Internal Revenue Code. 83 Inheritance is, 
therefore, income on the simple notion that it makes the debtor wealthier in the 
balance sheet sense. Accordingly, inheritances can be recaptured by the creditors if 
they move to modify the chapter 13 plan. Meanwhile, proceeds from a post-
confirmation mortgage (that is to say, loan proceeds) are not income, as no capital 
gain is thereby realized. 84 
One theory of the chapter 13 estate holds that section 1327(b) terminates the 
chapter 13 estate, but any property the debtor acquires after confirmation is in the 
estate. In United States v. Harchar,85 the IRS refused to pay a tax refund when it 
had unpaid pre-petition claims against the debtor. The court found that the tax 
refund, arising from post-petition wages, was property of the estate.86 Therefore, the 
Harchar court ruled, the IRS was guilty of violating section 362(a)(3), which bars 
"any act to obtain possession of property of the state or property from the estate or 
to exercise control over property of the estate."87 
How could this conclusion be squared with section 1327(b)? That section, the 
court thought, only transfers estate property to the debtor at the time of 
confirmation. Since the wages in question were earned in the post-confirmation 
period, such property was not covered by section 1327(b). The property was, 
therefore, property of the estate under section 1306(a).88 
81 See Murphy v. O'Donnell (In re Murphy), 474 F.3d 143, 154 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding when debtor 
sells his condominium and recognizes a net gain, trustee is authorized to modify plan). 
82 See 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) (gross income "does not include property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or 
inheritance"). 
83 See David Gray Carlson, Modification of Plans of Reorganization and the Basic Chapter 13 Bargain, 83 
AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2009), at Pt. III [hereinafter Carlson, Modification]. 
84 See Murphy, 474 F.3d at 150 ("By any stretch, a loan, regardless of the size, is not income."); In re 
Easley, 205 B.R. 334, 335-36 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (authorizing debtor, who borrowed money from his 
parents, to modify plan, even though loan money is not income and not increase in assets). 
85 371 B.R. 254 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
86 Id. at 268. 
87 Id. at 269. But, did not the Supreme Court in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995), 
authorize account debtors to refuse to pay without violating the automatic stay? According to the Harchar 
court, a bank that refuses to honor checks does not thereby control property of the estate, but merely refuses 
to perform a contractual obligation. The IRS, supposedly, does control property of the estate-the tax refund. 
This would be true if the federal government segregates the refund somehow, but it in fact does not do so. 
The federal government has an in personam obligation to pay the refund, just like a bank does. Therefore, 
Strumpf should have saved the day for the IRS. 
88 Harchar, 371 B.R. at 268 (N.D. Ohio 2007); accord In re Jackson, 403 B.R. 95, 100 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
2009) ("Any assets acquired by the debtor after confirmation, but before the case is closed, converted or 
dismissed, become property of the bankruptcy estate under§ 306."). This overlooks the fact that a job is an 
executory contract under Bankruptcy Code section 365 and is, therefore, property of the bankruptcy estate. 
Section 54l(a)(6) excludes proceeds of the job from the bankruptcy estate, but not the job itself. 
Accordingly, confirmation of the chapter 13 plan transfers the job back to the debtor. Assuming the debtor 
held the same job throughout the post-confirmation period, the wages are proceeds of pre-confirmation 
property. They are not proceeds received in the first instance. The wages held by the IRS were, therefore, 
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In any case, all this was beside the point. The court also properly recognized 
that the IRS, a pre-petition creditor, violated section 362(a)(6) by trying to collect a 
pre-petition debt. Any error in the theory of the chapter 13 estate was harmless.89 
My main motive in highlighting the Harchar opinion is its concept of after-
acquired property. This holding is motivated by the sense that section 1327(b) must 
mean something. According to Harchar, section 1327(b) absolutely transfers 
whatever estate property exists as of confirmation of the plan. But whatever the 
debtor acquired after confirmation is immune from section 1327(b ), which by its 
terms refers only to property in existence as of confirmation. Here, section 1306(a) 
supposedly governs to make the property "property of the estate. 1190 
Under the Harchar view, any inheritance or gift of any sort received after 
confirmation of the plan is in the bankruptcy estate, but anything that existed in the 
bankruptcy estate on the day of confirmation is transferred to the debtor under 
section 1327(b). The Christmas after confirmation is a sad one under this theory, as 
the chapter 13 trustee scoops up all the presents under the tree.91 
In my view, this is all wet, and many courts agree. 92 The claim is impossibly 
broad. Taken literally, every existent thing in the bankruptcy estate is transferred to 
the debtor on confirmation, but any new thing (including proceeds of debtor 
property) is property of the estate. Therefore, if the debtor buys a car after the 
confirmation of the plan, the car belongs to the bankruptcy estate. The debtor dares 
not sell the car without court permission pursuant to section 363(b ). But, the pre-
confirmation car could be sold post-confirmation without court permission. 
Proceeds of that car, however, cannot be used without court permission, as the 
proceeds are property of the estate (even though the car wasn't). This obviously 
makes no sense. 
The Bankruptcy Code is elsewhere rather hostile to "dragnet" powers in 
creditors. According to Bankruptcy Code section 552(a): "[e]xcept as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section, property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after 
the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security 
proceeds of property the debtor owned free and clear of the bankruptcy estate. But, wages are proceeds of 
the employment contract. Proceeds are by nature after-acquired property, and therefore, on the Harchar 
court's theory, property of the estate after confirmation. 
89 In In re Grogg, 295 B.R. 297 (Banlcr. C.D. Ill. 2003), a post confirmation debtor arguably became 
entitled to life insurance proceeds. Not sure, the insurance company moved to lift automatic stay in order to 
start an interpleader action in light of a dispute. The court agreed that the insurance proceeds were property 
of the banlcruptcy estate and that therefore the automatic stay applied. No mention of section 1327(b) was 
made. 
90 See In re Guentert, 206 B.R. 958, 961-62 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (endorsing after-acquired property 
theory in both chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases). 
91 However, Christmas is not really about the presents. See DR. SEUSS, How THE GRINCH STOLE 
CHRISTMAS (Random House 1985) (1957). 
92 See, e.g., In re Toth, 193 B.R. 992, 997 (Banlcr. N.D. Ga. 1996) ("Subjecting postpetition creditors to the 
automatic stay and blocking attempts to collect following postconfirmation defaults would make a debtor a 
credit pariah."); In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5, 15 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990) ("[P]roperty of the estate vests in 
the debtor and is no longer property of estate, unless the plan or order of confirmation provides otherwise."). 
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agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case. "93 This 
key provision considers after-acquired property agreements to be inequitable, as 
they bestow on the debtor the peculiar capacity to acquire property for the benefit of 
another (even if the debtor personally does not intend this result). The after-
acquired property clause makes a debtor the abject slave of the creditor, and so 
section 552(a) admirably strikes from the wrist of the debtor the chafing shackles of 
the after-acquired property clause. 
How good a theory of chapter 13 is it that reimposes this very slavery on the 
debtor, granting to the debtor all estate property, but then perpetuating the 
subservience of the debtor with regard to after-acquired property? On this 
erroneous view, the debtor does not need court permission to dispose of that which 
he owned on the day the plan was confirmed, but he is in contempt of court if he 
conveys something acquired the day after confirmation. 
In fact, there is reason to think this is not what Congress intended. This 
argument has to do with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in In re Lybroo/<4 and 
Congress's overruling of that opinion in 1994.95 
In Lybrook, a debtor filed for chapter 13.96 Before the plan was confirmed but 
more than 180 days after the bankruptcy petition, the debtor inherited substantial 
property. Instead of confirming a chapter 13 plan, the debtor converted the case to 
chapter 7 in the hope that there, the debtor might wrest the inheritance away from 
the creditors. The court ruled that, under section 1306(a), the inheritance was 
property of the chapter 13 estate and that this, therefore, was also property of the 
chapter 7 estate. This was so, even though had the debtor filed for chapter 7 
initially, the inheritance would have eluded the creditors.97 In chapter 7, only 
inheritances acquired 180 days after the petition are in the chapter 7 estate.98 
Congress, in 1994, elected to change the result for chapter 13 cases.99 
According to the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may keep all 
after-acquired property from the chapter 7 trustee. An exception is made for bad 
faith debtors (such as the Lybrooks), who converted their case before a plan was 
confirmed. The bad faith rule is that the debtors must surrender assets acquired 
93 11 U.S.C. § 552(a). Subsection (b) preserves for creditors proceeds of pre-petition collateral (plus rents 
and proceeds of hotels). Post-petition proceeds are a type of after-acquired property which otherwise would 
be disencumbered by section 552(a). 
94 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991). 
95 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, H.R.5116, 103rd Cong. § 303 (1994) (altering rule of Lybrook so 
property included in estate affected by chapter conversions). 
9 951 F.2d at 136. 
97 See id. 
98 See 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(5) (2006). · 
99 The Lybrookresult still holds in chapter 11 cases. As with chapter 13, confirmation of a chapter 11 estate 
terminates the bankruptcy estate and "vests" it in the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 114l(b) ("Except as otherwise 
provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of 
the estate in the debtor."). A chapter 11 case may convert to chapter 7 after confirmation. See 11 U.S.C. § 
1112(b)(4)(N) (defining cause as conversion for a material breach of a confirmed plan). If so, all of the 
debtor's property is transferred to the chapter 7 trustee, even if acquired after the petition is filed. 
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before confirmation of a plan. But after confirmation, even bad faith debtors may 
keep after-acquired property, such as inheritances. According to section 348(£)(2): 
"[i]f the debtor converts a case under chapter 13 of this title to a case under another 
chapter under this title in bad faith, the property of the estate in the converted case 
shall consist of property of the estate as of the date of conversion." 100 This section 
does not mention confirmation of a plan, but it is clear that what the debtor must 
surrender to the chapter 7 trustee is property of the estate (not property of the 
debtor). Since confirmation (I claim) makes the debtor the owner of pre-
confirmation property of the estate, section 348(f)(2) properly refers solely to 
property, if any, under the control of the chapter 13 trustee. 101 The post-confirmation 
inheritance belongs to the debtor alone. 
If that is the rule for converted chapter 7 cases, surely it is the rule for chapter 
13 cases, where the debtor is faithfully following the plan, lawfully confirmed by 
the bankruptcy court. 
V. DISCLOSURE OF ASSETS 
As part of a bankruptcy petition, any debtor must file a schedule of assets. 102 
Suppose a chapter 13 debtor acquires an asset after confirmation. Must a debtor 
amend the schedule of assets originally filed? 
Properly, the answer should be no. Once a chapter 13 plan is confirmed, the 
assets in effect become irrelevant. 103 The only purpose the schedule of assets serves 
is to accomplish the "best interest of the creditors" test on the day of confirmation. 
Therefore, nothing is served by compelling the debtor to update his schedule after a 
plan is confirmed.104 
A chapter 13 plan may be modified. According to section 1329(b ), the 
modification must conform to the requirements of section 1325(a), including the 
100 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(2) ( emphasis added). The italicized language was added by BAPCPA. 
101 See In re Brown, 375 B.R. 362, 380 n.28 (Banlcr. W.D. Mich. 2007) ("A Chapter 13 estate will include 
whatever the debtor has acquired post-petition in the event the case is converted prior to confirmation of a 
plan."). 
102 See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (a)(l)(B)(i) (requiring debtor to file "a list of creditors; and unless the court orders 
otherwise--a schedule of assets and liabilities"). 
103 But see In re Easley, 205 B.R. 334, 335 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) ("The debtor is obligated to advise the 
trustee of the event and to file a supplemental schedule listing this asset."). The Easley court draws this 
principle from In re Euerle, which involved a pre-confirmation inheritance. 70 B.R. 72 (Banlcr. D. N.H. 
1987). Since the inheritance should have been included in the "best interest of the creditors" test, the 
schedules became misleading when the inheritance came into existence. This is a different situation from the 
case where the inheritance occurs after confirmation of the plan. 
104 See Smith v. Scales Express, Inc., No. 05-331-BH-B, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53638, at **6--7 (S.D. 
Ala. Aug. 2, 2006) (finding no duty to disclose because "post Chapter 13 confirmation cause of action 
against ... [defendant] was statutorily never meant to be included in the bankruptcy estate."); In re Foreman, 
378 B.R. 717, 722-23 (Banlcr. S.D. Ga. 2007) ("Debtor's wrongful death action arose postconfirmation, and 
no party has asserted that Debtor's potential recovery in that action is necessary to fulfill the plan . . . the 
cause of action is not property of the estate, and Debtor is not required to amend her schedules to disclose it 
to this Court."). 
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"best interest of the creditors" test. But, if section 1329(b) is properly interpreted, 
then this test is done once and for all in the original confirmation. It is not redone 
as of the time of the modification. This would violate the basic chapter 13 bargain, 
whereby the debtor keeps all assets in exchange for wages. The only thing that 
modification can accomplish is adjustment when the disposable income of the 
debtor changes. 105 In contrast to changes in assets, changes in income are highly 
relevant to modifying chapter 13 plans, which unsecured creditors may bring about. 
New section 521(t)(4)(B) now requires that chapter 13 debtors file: 
(B) annually after the plan is confirmed and until the case is closed, 
not later than the date that is 45 days before the anniversary of the 
confirmation of the plan; a statement, under penalty of perjury, of 
the income and expenditures of the debtor during the tax year of the 
debtor most recently concluded before such statement is filed under 
this paragraph, and of the monthly income of the debtor, that shows 
how income, expenditures, and monthly income are calculated.106 
Chapter 13, therefore, (after BAPCPA) explicitly envisions reports on income, but 
not on "principal"-i.e., non-income assets. 
Nevertheless, in Waldron v. Brown (In re Waldron), 107 a debtor was uselessly 
made to amend his schedule because he had the good fortune of being injured in a 
post-confirmation automobile accident and, therefore, was now the owner of a 
cause of action under an uninsured motorist act. 
The Waldron court reached its conclusion by reading section 1306(a) in 
isolation. Therefore, even though all property was sold back to the debtor at 
confirmation, property of the estate still existed, and the cause of action was part of 
that property. 
How does this cohere with section 1327(b)? The Waldron court makes the 
after-acquired property point that I criticized earlier. 108 According to the Waldron 
court, section 1327(b) succeeds in giving back to the debtor only property of the 
estate that existed at the time of confirmation. After-acquired property is governed 
by section 1306(a) alone-not by section 1327(b).109 So, any post-confirmation 
injury is part of the chapter 13 estate. " 0 
Even if true or defensible, the matter is irrelevant. The debtor is solely entitled 
105 I develop this proposition at length in Carlson, Modification, supra note 83, at Pt. IV(A). 
106 11 U.S.C. § 52l(f)(4)(B). 
107 536 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2008). 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 81-10 I. 
109 Accord In re Nott, 269 B.R. 250, 256-57 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000). 
110 Where the creditors would get all the damages from pain and suffering, there is decent support for the 
proposition that the plaintiff-debtor has not actually been injured after all. That is to say, it is no tort to injure 
the insolvent. See generally David Gray Carlson, Indemnity, Liability, Insolvency, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1951 (2004 ). 
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to possess property of the estate. 111 Creditors in chapter 13 are entitled to disposable 
income only. The personal injury award would have to become income before the 
creditors could expropriate it by modifying a chapter 13 plan. 
The Waldron court purports to find plenty of precedent for its decision, but not 
all the cases cited are pertinent. For example, the court rests heavily on Barbosa v. 
Soloman, 112 where a trustee moved to modify a plan because the debtors had made a 
nice profit in selling a real estate investment. The property was acquired pre-
petition, but the proceeds were generated post-petition. Although the Barbosa court 
is unclear, it should be the case (and undoubtedly was) that plan modification was 
based on capturing the post-tax capital gain-i.e., disposable income. Increases in 
disposable income is fair game in modifications, but non-income assets are not. 
In addition, the Waldron court relies on cases in which a debtor filed for 
bankruptcy and never listed a lawsuit as an asset. 113 After bankruptcy, debtors are 
estopped from claiming that their claims have value. These cases, however, cannot 
be used to prove that post-confirmation acquisitions are property of the bankruptcy 
estate. These cases involve a failure to disclose the existence of a pre-petition asset. 
In any case, the Waldron court's holding was very limited: "[w]e do not hold 
that a debtor has a free-standing duty to disclose the acquisition of any property 
interest after the confirmation of his plan under Chapter 13. Neither the Bankruptcy 
Code nor the Bankruptcy Rules mention such a duty." 114 The court merely held that 
the bankruptcy court had discretion to order the debtors to amend their schedules. 
It is relevant that BAPCPA adds a new disclosure requirement under section 
521(f)(4)(B).115 If the cause of action in Waldron (a pre-BAPCPA case) had to be 
reported in a BAPCPA venue, surely, then it must have been reported under section 
521(f)(4)(B). Here, Congress addressed and presumably exhausted the subject of 
post-confirmation disclosure. 
If a debtor has a duty to disclose acquisition of an asset after confirmation of a 
plan, unfair use of judicial estoppel may arise. Judicial estoppel has been used 
where a debtor allegedly has a pre-petition cause of action and does not disclose it 
in a schedule of assets. 116 Suppose, however, the debtor has a cause of action that 
arises after a chapter 13 plan is confirmed. If there is a duty to disclose the asset, 
111 See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2006) (authorizing debtor to possess all property of estate unless otherwise 
stated in confirmed plan). 
112 235 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2000). 
113 See Ajaka v. BrooksAmerica Mortgage Corp., 453 F.3d 1339, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing 
debtor's lack of disclosure of his TILA claim); Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (barring debtor from pursuing monetary claims from lawsuit for not disclosing lawsuit to 
bankruptcy court). 
114 Waldron v. Brown (In re Waldron) 536 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2008). 
115 See supra text accompanying note 106. 
116 See Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 447--48 (7th Cir. 2006) (precluding debtor from bringing 
employment discrimination lawsuit because debtor filed bankruptcy petition at same time as lawsuit and 
debtor denied any valuable legal claims in petition). 
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then judicial estoppel equally applies. A state court has so concluded. 117 
Presumably, the Waldron court's holding that the debtor does not have a "free-
standing duty" 118 to disclose post-confirmation causes of action precludes unfair use 
of the estoppel concept. 119 
Just such an issue in Woodward v. Taco Bueno Restaurants, Inc.,120 occasioned 
the invention of a new theory of the chapter 13 estate. In Woodward, a debtor with 
a confirmed chapter 13 plan suffered post-confirmation employment discrimination. 
He sued, and the defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of judicial 
estoppel. The premise was that the debtor had a duty to report post-confirmation 
property to the bankruptcy court. The debtor did not report the employment cause 
of action. Therefore, the employer reasoned, the cause of action must have no value 
( or otherwise it would have been disclosed). 
The Woodward court denied summary judgment, because it found the law 
requiring disclosure of post-confirmation assets to be unclear. Nevertheless, the 
court proffered a new theory of the chapter 13 estate. According to this theory, 
section 1306(a) makes the new cause of action part of the bankruptcy estate. 
Property of the estate then "vests" back to the debtor under section 1327(b). 
Therefore, the theory looks to what the word "vest" means. 
Resorting to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, the Woodward court discovered that 
"to vest" means "[t]o give an immediate, fixed right of present or future 
enjoyment."121 The Woodward court, therefore, read section 1327(b) as simply 
promising enjoyment of assets only after the plan is completed. 
Under this interpretation, after confirmation, the bankruptcy estate 
continues to exist and assets may be added to the estate in 
accordance with section 1306, but the debtor is immediately vested 
with the right to the future enjoyment of the assets in that estate 
free and clear of any creditor claims provided for by the plan once 
117 See Period Homes, Ltd. v. Wallick, 569 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Ga. 2002) (stating debtors who file under 
chapter 7 or 11 have no duty to disclose causes of actions, however, debtors filing under chapter 13 have an 
affirmative duty to disclose under section 1306(a)); see also Wolfork v. Tackett, 540 S.E.2d 611, 612 (Ga. 
2001) (applying judicial estoppel where debtor failed to disclose tort claim arising during chapter 13 
proceeding). 
118 536 F.3d at 1246. 
119 See generally Theresa M. Beiner & Robert B. Chapman, Take What You Can, Give Nothing Back: 
Judicial Estoppel, Employment Discrimination, Bankruptcy and Piracy in the Courts, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1, 20 (2005) ( contrasting different courts' decisions to estop chapter 13 debtors for their failure to disclose 
lawsuits). 
120 No. 4:05-CV-804-Y, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89135, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2006) (examining chapter 
13 debtor's duty to disclose cause of action arising two years after confirmation of plan). 
121 Id. at *25 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1563 (6th ed. 1990)). The Woodard court has been 
criticized for using an out-of-date dictionary. See West Va. State Tax Dep't v. Mullins (In re Mullins), No. 06-
3625 (RHK/AJB). 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90691, at **14-15 (S.D. W. Va. September 30, 2009). If 
dictionaries change willy-nilly at the caprice of their editors, perhaps they should not be used in serious 
litigation. 
! ! I 11 
I 1111 
I: I;: 
Ii I 11 
1 I I ii 
I: I :1 
1 i I 1 
I I! ,1 
I I 11 
256 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17: 233 
he faithfully completes his obligations under the plan and is entitled 
to a discharge. 122 
But what is the point of saying such a cause of action is in the bankruptcy estate? If 
the plan is completed, then the debtor finally owns it. If the plan is in default and 
converts to chapter 7, then the debtor also owns it. If the case is dismissed, then the 
debtor likewise owns it. Nothing is accomplished in this new theory of the chapter 
13 estate. 
A harder issue is the cause of action that arises after the bankruptcy petition but 
before plan confirmation. Such a cause of action should figure in the "best interest 
of the creditors" test of section 1325(a)(4). This test must be performed as of the 
effective date of the plan. Yet most reported opinions wrongly assume that the date 
of the bankruptcy petition is the date as of which the test must be performed. 123 
Under such a view, the cause of action becomes irrelevant to the "best interest" 
calculation. Where the test is correctly performed, however, tort defendants will be 
unable to find any specific bankruptcy rule that requires the original asset schedules 
to be supplemented. 
VI. PERMISSION TO SELL OR ENCUMBER 
A proper theory of the chapter 13 estate implies that a debtor is free to alienate 
assets once the plan is confirmed. 
Prior to confirmation of the plan, this is not so. According to section 1303, "the 
debtor shall have, exclusive of the trustee, the rights and powers of a trustee under 
section[] 363(b) .... "124 According to section 363(b), a trustee may use, sell, or 
lease property of the estate out of the ordinary course of business only with court 
permission. Ergo, prior to confirmation, chapter 13 debtors, like trustees, must 
obtain court permission to use, sell, or lease property of the estate. 
Clearly, debtors in the pre-confirmation period do not seek court permission 
every time they "use" the family lawn mower or make a trip to the grocery store to 
spend post-petition wages. They do routinely seek permission to sell a house, 
however. 125 There is no good theory, other than common sense, that explains why, 
prior to confirmation, debtors need not seek permission to use property of the estate 
for ordinary living purposes. Trustees in chapter 7 must do so, but the thought that 
122 Woodward, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89135, at *26. 
123 See LUNDIN, supra note 10, at§ 160.1 and accompanying text; see also In re Green, 169 B.R. 480,482 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) ("[T]he date the petition was filed is the point in time at which to measure the 
amount which would have been paid to unsecured creditors .... "). 
124 11 u.s.c. § 1303 (2006). 
125 See In re Perez, 339 B.R. 385, 398-99 n.14 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (interpreting section 363(b) to 
allow chapter 13 debtor to sell residence after notice and hearing); see also In re Dawson, 411 B.R. 1, 26 
n.22 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2008) (requiring notice and hearing under section 363(b) before debtor may pursue 
property cause of action). 
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a chapter 13 debtor must also do so is absurd. Transactions in the ordinary course 
of business do not require court permission, 126 but the trip to the grocery store is not 
the course of a consumer debtor's business. If read literally, section 363(b) requires 
court permission to use or sell anything. Without any justification from the 
Bankruptcy Code, judges have simply declared that debtors, without court 
permission, may dissipate the chapter 13 estate for ordinary living expenses. 127 
Undoubtedly, such a rule lightens the motion calendar. 128 But it exalts common 
sense over the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Whatever may be true prior to confirmation, according to the DT, the debtor 
needs no permission to sell anything after confirmation. 129 Courts, however, have 
reached a different conclusion. In Bargeski v. Rose, 130 a post-confirmation debtor 
conveyed a cotenancy in her house to her husband, from whom she was separated. 
Later, she converted her case to chapter 7. Properly, the cotenancy was hers to give. 
Nevertheless, the court approved the trustee's avoidance action against the non-
debtor spouse.131 No justification of this holding was made in light of section 
1327(b), but obviously the court assumed that confirmation of the estate did not 
terminate the chapter 13 estate. 132 The court virtually apologized to the non-debtor 
spouse: 
While the harsh reality faced by Albert seems unjust because he did 
126 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(l) (2006) ("The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other 
than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate, ... "). 
127 See In re Laflamme, 397 B.R. 194, 204 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2008) ("The Bankruptcy Code ... does not 
contain any explicit provision that governs what a debtor can do with chapter 13 estate property while the 
debtor is waiting to have a proposed plan confirmed. Presumably a debtor must be able to use earnings to 
pay ordinary and necessary living expenses in that interim gap period."); In re Fisher, 198 B.R. 721, 733 
n.18 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Chapter 13 debtors have authority under Section 1303 to deal with estate 
property in the ordinary course, which should include expending estate property for ordinary living 
expenses. Only extraordinary purchases, sales, and credit transactions should require court approval."), rev'd 
on other grounds, 203 B.R. 958 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
128 See In re Laflamme, 397 B.R. at 204-05 ("The administrative burdens and uncertainties attendant upon 
such a radical departure from Chapter XIII practice ... would be a substantial deterrent to chapter 13 use by 
nonbusiness debtors."). 
129 See In re Suratt, No. 95-6183-HO, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22610, at **2-4 (D. Or. Jan. 10, 1996) 
(acknowledging debtors may use, sell, or lease property once property vested); see also In re Jemison, No. 
07-40761, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3107, at **21-22 (Bankr. N.D. Ala Sept. 6, 2007) ("Would debtors seek 
Court approval to hold a garage sale for property of the estate having a value of $50?"); In re Rangel, 233 
B.R. 191, 198 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999). 
130 No. RWT 05-0962, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29059, at*!, (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2006), ajj'd sub nom Rose v. 
Bar~eski, No. 06-1480, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18110 (4th Cir. July 30, 2007). 
13 See id. at **3-4. . 
132 The court assumed that section 549(a) was relevant, but section 549(a) assumes a valid conveyance that 
must be avoided. In fact, the better theory is that the debtor simply had no ability to convey property of the 
estate without court permission. Properly, section 549(a) applies only if the transferor has some legitimate 
power over the bankruptcy estate. See generally David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy's Acephalous Moment: 
Postpetition Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Code, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 113 (2004). Of course, if the 
cotenancy was already out of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor had every right to make a conveyance. 
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nothing of a dishonest nature in connection with this property, this 
Court agrees with the observation of the Bankruptcy Court that 
"this case involves an unfortunate combination of actions taken in 
good faith . . . that interacted with the harsh provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code to produce [this] unfair result." 133 
In fact, this unfair result should not be blamed entirely on the Bankruptcy Code. 
According to section 1327(b), confirmation transfers the chapter 13 estate to the 
debtor who rightfully conveyed the cotenancy to the spouse. 134 
Debtors nevertheless needlessly seek court permission following the 
confirmation of a chapter 13 plan, sometimes to their regret. In In re Drew, 135 
debtors sought to refinance their mortgages. They wished to pay the plan amounts 
early, thereby, ending the plan. Properly, the debtors did not need court permission 
to refinance. They did (arguably) need court permission to modify the plan in order 
to "reduce the time for [plan] payments."136 Motions for permission to refinance 
( coupled with early payout) should, therefore, be interpreted as motions to modify a 
confirmed chapter 13 plan pursuant to section 1329(a). 
The Drew court thought that, if the debtor were to borrow funds, those funds 
would be property of the estate (at least where a pre-petition house served as 
collateral for the loan). 137 Such a view erases section 1327(b) from the Bankruptcy 
Code. But, in addition, the fact that loan proceeds were in the chapter 13 estate is 
irrelevant. Debtors are permitted to possess property of the estate. 138 They are 
required to pay projected disposable income to the trustee and are not required to 
liquidate the chapter 13 estate for the benefit of creditors. They may do so,139 but 
are not required to do so. 
The Drew court justified its decision with dictum from Black v. United States 
133 Bargeski, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29059, at **10-11. 
134 The court mitigated its holding by ruling that the non-debtor spouse only had to pay the value of the 
cotenancy as calculated on the day of the bankruptcy petition. See id. at *14. The court thought that such a 
conclusion was required by section 348(f)(l)(B), which, at the time, provided that "valuations of property .. 
. in the Chapter 13 case shall apply in the converted case." Id. at *13. Presumably, the court had in its mind 
that the house was valued for purposes of the "best interest of the creditors" test when the plan was 
confirmed, and the house should be deemed worth only that much. This is a very dubious reading of section 
348(f)(l)(B). The premise of the court's (erroneous) opinion is that the cotenancy in question was in, rather 
than outside, the estate. This fact has nothing to do with valuations. In any case, BAPCPA has been amended 
to negate any chapter 13 valuations in a converted chapter 7 case. 
135 325 B.R. 765 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005). 
136 See 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(2) (2006). Courts are divided on this. See Carlson, Modification, supra note 
83, at Pt. IV(B). 
137 325 B.R. at 770 (allowing gifts, inheritances and windfalls acquired by debtor post-petition to be 
included in chapter 13 estate). 
138 See 11 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006) ("[T]he debtor shall have ... the rights and powers of a trustee under 
sections 363(b), 363(d), 363(e), 363(f), and 363(1), of this title."). 
139 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8) (2006) (stating a plan may "provide for the payment of all or part of a claim 
against the debtor from property of the estate or property of the debtor"). 
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Postal Service (In re Heath): 140 
We read the two sections, 1306(a)(2) and 1327(b), to mean simply 
that while the filing of the petition for bankruptcy places all the 
property of the debtor in the control of the bankruptcy court, the 
plan upon confirmation returns so much of that property to the 
debtor's control as if not necessary to the fulfillment of the plan.141 
259 
According to the Drew court, the mortgage proceeds were necessary to fulfillment 
of the plan and, therefore, property of the estate: "[t]hus, the Court holds that the 
refinancing proceeds are part of the Debtors' bankruptcy estates post-confirmation 
because those proceeds were acquired by the Debtors for use in making payments 
under their confirmed plans."142 But this is entirely circular reasoning. The loan 
proceeds were part of the bankruptcy estate only because the court (not the debtor) 
decided that the creditors should receive the loan proceeds. 
This violates the basic deal in chapter 13: in exchange for paying projected 
disposable income for a stipulated time, the debtor gets to keep all assets of the 
bankruptcy estate. Granted, if the creditors find out about surplus income beyond 
the amount projected in the plan, they can move to modify the plan.143 But they can 
never force the debtor to borrow in order to increase the payout to creditors. In 
effect, the court countenanced a raid by the chapter 13 trustee on non-income assets 
by means of modification. 
In Drew, by the time the trustee moved to modify the plan, the debtors had 
already obtained new mortgage loans on the increased value of their homes. But, 
conceptually, Drew also countenances forcing debtors into mortgage or even 
outright sales of the home. If the court can exploit the fact that the debtor has 
borrowed and can order the proceeds be paid to the creditors, then it can likewise 
insist that the debtor sell the house in order to generate proceeds for the creditors. 
The illegitimate principle of Drew is that debtors can be forced, through the 
modification procedure, into liquidating non-income assets for the benefit of 
creditors. 144 This violates the basic chapter 13 bargain and cannot be countenanced. 
Another oft-cited case that erases from our distracted globes the memory of 
section 1327(b) is In re Aneiro145 where the chapter 13 debtor ran a pizza parlor 
from leased premises. The lease was assumed under the confirmed plan. Later, the 
debtor and the landlord amended the lease to cover less space at a lower rent and 
140 115 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 1997). 
141 Id. at 524. 
142 In re Drew, 325 B.R. 765, 770 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005). 
143 See Carlson, Modification, supra note 83, at Pt. IV(A). 
144 The deadline for the trustee's motion to modify is completion of payments under the plan. The Drew 
court intimated that, had the debtors tendered some of the loan proceeds in satisfaction of the plan 
obliption, the trustee's motion to modify would have been too late. See In re Drew, 325 B.R. at 770---71. 
14 72 B.R. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987). 
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shorter term. The debtor defaulted on rent, and the landlord's successor in interest 
moved to lift the automatic stay. 146 
According to the Aniero court, the modifications in the lease were invalid. The 
debtor's lease was property of the estate, and the debtor could not convey back some 
of the space and time under the lease. But, according to section 1327(b), the lease 
was entirely transferred back to the debtor, who was free to modify it without court 
permission. 147 
In re Fatsis148 is a stark example of injustice. In Fatsis, a debtor sold stock 
post-petition and used the proceeds to make plan payments. 149 In my view, the 
debtor was authorized to sell the stock and not use the proceeds for plan payments. 
Here, the debtor sold the stock and used it to fund the plan-a noble act of sacrifice 
not required by the Bankruptcy Code. 
In bankruptcy as in life, no good deed goes unpunished. When the case was 
later converted to chapter 7, the trustee moved for sanctions against the debtor. The 
court agreed and fined the debtor $13,332. It should be noted, however, that the 
confirmation order forbade the debtor from transferring any property, and it 
contained this clause: 
[A]ll property of the estate as defined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 and 1306 
including, but not limited to, any appreciation of the value of real 
property owned by the debtor as of the commencement of the case, 
shall remain property of the estate during the term of the plan and 
shall vest in the debtor(s) only upon discharge. 150 
In short, the court, in its confirmation order, thought it had the right to repeal 
section 1327(b) altogether. And, indeed, section 1327(b) is conditioned as follows: 
"[ e ]xcept as otherwise provided in . . . the order confirming the plan, the 
confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor." 151 One 
146 Id. at 428. 
147 See 11 U.S. C. § 1327 (2006) ("[T]he confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the 
debtor."). Since the lessor's motion assumed that the lease existed as modified, the court denied the lessor's 
motion to lift the stay. Nevertheless, the debtor was. not paying rent. So, presumably, the lessor could return 
to court citing the lease as originally executed. After all, no rent was being paid on this lease either. See In re 
Aneiro, 72 B.R. at 430. 
148 396 B.R. 579 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) aff'd, 405 B.R. I (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009). 
149 See id. at 581. Or, so, the debtor claimed. On appeal, the appellate panel remarked, "there is no 
evidence in the record which conclusively establishes that the Debtor actually paid all or even some of the 
$13,332.43 to the Trustee." In re Fatsis, 405 B.R. 1, 11 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009). 
150 In re Fatsis, 405 B.R. at 4. 
151 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (2006) (emphasis added). The Fatsis case cites In re Beesley, 139 B.R. 247 (Bankr. 
D. Idaho 1992), but this case involved the pre-confirmation sale of a boat without court permission. Such a 
sale does require court permission. There is something odd in Beesley. The debtor sold the boat (at a cut-rate 
price to a friend) and then remitted the proceeds to the chapter 13 trustee. The trustee then sued the buyer 
under section 549 for avoidance of a post-petition transfer. But, if the debtor had no authority to transfer 
property of the estate, section 549 is hardly needed for the trustee to recover the boat. Rather, the trustee 
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cannot help but view the confirmation order in Fatsis as rewriting the plan against 
the will of the debtor (who is supposed to have that right),152 and legislatively 
repealing section 1327(b) to boot. In short, the court issued an illegal confirmation 
order and, then, punished the debtor for not following it, even though the debtor 
was sacrificing an asset in order to fund the plan, an act which the Bankruptcy Code 
does not require. 153 
Courts occasionally hold that post-confirmation debtors must humbly request 
permission to borrow.154 But, how can this be countenanced, in light of section 
1304(b)? According to this confusing provision: 
Unless the court orders otherwise, a debtor engaged in business 
may operate the business of the debtor and, subject to any 
limitations on a trustee under sections 363(c) and 364 of this title 
and to such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, shall 
have, exclusive of the trustee, the rights and powers of the trustee 
under such sections.155 
This section states that a debtor operating a business must get court permission to 
borrow. Presumably, this provision is canceled when the plan is confirmed. But, 
even if it is not cancelled, the Bankruptcy Code requires debtors in business to seek 
court permission to borrow pursuant to section 364. Is it not obvious that debtors 
who are not in business may borrow (if they can) without court permission, whether 
before or after the bankruptcy petition? 
Whether debtors need permission to borrow raises the puzzle of section 1305. 
This infrequently cited provision permits post-petition creditors to file proofs of 
claim, apparently with the end of coming under the plan terms. 156 The claims, 
could have brought a turnover action under section 542(a). But, whether proceeding under section 542(a) or 
section 549, the trustee could not recover the boat and keep the proceeds of the boat. The two actions are 
inconsistent. Retention of the funds suggests that the trustee ratified the sale after the fact. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 
549 & 542(a) (2006). 
152 See 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) ("The debtor shall file a plan."). 
153 See In re Fatsis, 396 B.R. at 580, 582-83. A better vision of the chapter 13 estate occurs in In re Krick, 
373 B.R. 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2007). In Krick, the debtor entered chapter 13 as cotenant of property. A plan 
was confirmed, according to which the debtor was to pay rent to the other cotenants and was not to convey 
or encumber her real estate interest. (Usually, it is said that cotenants do not owe rent to other cotenants.) 
The debtor nevertheless conveyed her cotenancy to the other cotenants. Later, the chapter 13 case, as usual, 
converted to chapter 7. 
154 See In re Rangel, 233 B.R. 191, 194 n.1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (requiring debtor to request permission 
before acquiring post-petition consumer debt); In re Fisher, 198 B.R. 721, 729 n.13 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(discussing requirement of obtaining court's permission before securing certain types of credit), rev'd, 203 
B.R. 958 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also LUNDIN, supra note 10, at§ 262.1 ("[I]n most jurisdictions, the plan, the 
order of confirmation or local rule forbids debtors to incur new debt without court approval."). 
155 11 U.S.C. § 1304(b) (2006). 
156 See 11 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006). Whereas a debtor may file a proof of claim for a creditor under 11 U .S.C. 
§ 501(c), section 1305(a) permits only an "entity that holds a claim against the debtor" to file. /rt re Bagby, 
218 B.R. 878, 887 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1998) (asserting only holder of post-petition claim, not debtor, may 
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however, are limited to taxes157 and consumer debt "that is for property or services 
necessary for the debtor's performance under the plan." 158 If such a post-petition 
11;,, claim is allowed, the plan may (but apparently need not) provide for its payment. 159 
:!i:: Section 1305(c) mysteriously provides: "A claim filed under subsection (a)(2) 
:;::: of this section shall be disallowed if the holder ... knew or should have known that 
prior approval by the trustee of the debtor's incurring the obligation was practicable 
and was not obtained."160 What is the meaning of section 1305(c)? Probably 
nothing, where the creditor chooses not to file a proof of claim. 161 Post-confirmation 
creditors have no need for a proof of claim where they can attach assets free and 
clear of the automatic stay. 162 
1 111111 
Section 1305 should properly be viewed as limited to the pre-confirmation 
period. Once the plan is confirmed, it is simply too late for post-petition creditors 
to participate. Plans may be modified, but there is a school of thought that holds 
post-confirmation allowance of claims is simply not permitted to wear the garb of 
plan modification. 163 Nevertheless, at least a few courts have intimated that post-
petition creditors may file proofs of claim after confirmation and that the plan may 
be modified to pay off such creditors on a senior basis. 164 
file proof of claim); see also In re Trentham, 145 B.R. 564, 567 n.5 (Banlcr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) ("[D]ebtor has 
no standing ... to file a proof of claim on behalf of postpetition creditor."). 
157 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(l) (2006). 
158 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(2). Debtor attorneys, however, may not skip the procedures of section 330 and use 
section 1305(a)(2) instead. See In re Phillips, 219 B.R. 1001, 1008 (Banlcr. W.D. Tenn. 1998) ("Simply put, § 
1305 is not the appropriate procedural vehicle for an attorney to seek to collect postpetition fees for 
providing routine legal services."). 
159 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8) (2006) ("[T]he plan may ... provide for the payment of all or part of a 
claim against the debtor from property of the estate or property of the debtor."). 
160 11 U.S.C. 1305(c). 
161 See In re Ziegler, 136 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). If a post-petition creditor chooses to file a 
proof of claim, the proof of claim is not, like in other cases, deemed allowed unless someone objects. Rather, 
the court must decide to allow the claim. See In re Bagby, 218 B.R. at 886. Even if the debtor consents to the 
proof of claim, the claim is not allowed until the court says so. See id. at 887 (indicating claims will not be 
permitted until court administers hearing). 
162 See In re Gyulafia, 65 B.R. 913, 915-16 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986) (finding post-petition creditor "has a 
choice between voluntary participation in the wage-earner plan under section 1305 or going directly against 
the debtor pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law .... "); see also LUNDIN, supra note 10, at § 238.2 
(noting post-petition creditor may choose not to file proof of claim and may instead seek relief from stay to 
collect its claim). 
163 See Chrysler Fin. Corp. v. Nolan (In re Nolan), 232 F.3d 528, 532-34 (6th Cir. 2000) (determining that 
debtors may not use post-confirmation modification to alter treatment of secured claims); In re Gyulafia, 65 
B.R. at 917 (post-confirmation taxes treated as pre-petition claims and not collectable by IRS); Carlson, 
Modification, supra note 83, at Pt. V(B). One court worries about rendering statutory language superfluous, 
if the chapter 13 estate really ends at confirmation: "a post-confirmation creditor would not need to file such 
a claim." In re Rangel, 233 B.R. 191, 195 (Banlcr. D. Mass. 1999). But such a point is non-responsive. 
Section 1305 is not superfluous if it governs pre-confirmation claims against the bankruptcy estate. 
164 See, e.g., In re Bagby, 218 B.R. at 886 (denying approval of modification plan for failure to give proper 
notice); In re Trentham, 145 B.R. 564, 569 (Banlcr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (denying approval of modification plan 
because debtors did not receive trustee approval before obtaining credit). The court in Trentham also opined 
that post-petition creditors must be paid 100%, unless they consented to lesser treatment. Id. at 569 
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Finally, section 1328(d) warns that there can be no discharge of "an allowed 
claim filed under section 1305(a)(2) ... if prior approval by the trustee of the 
debtor's incurring such debt was practicable and was not obtained."165 The question 
arises how a post-petition claim can be allowed if no permission was obtained. The 
answer is that, under section 1305(c), a claim is disallowed only if the creditor knew 
or should have known that approval was practicable. A claim might be allowed 
even though there was no approval, provided the creditor was ignorant. So, where 
there was no approval and the claim was nevertheless allowed, there can be no 
discharge. But, so what? If a discharge is needed, then the debtor can simply file a 
new bankruptcy case and receive a discharge there. 166 
Do these provisions engender a duty to obtain permission to borrow, as some 
courts think:?167 Even if they did, it should be noted that court approval is not 
required-only trustee approval. Furthermore, oddly, any duty to seek approval 
would be related to "property or services necessary for the debtor's performance 
under the plan."168 If a debtor were to borrow in order to finance a luxury vacation, 
no approval is necessary since a luxury vacation is presumably not necessary to 
performing the plan. 
In any case, these sections, read together, indicate that, when the debtor borrows 
money without permission, the debtor actually owes the money. The act of 
borrowing is not ultra vires. This act is not like acts in violation of the automatic 
stay, for example, which are said to be void acts.169 The only penalty for 
unapproved borrowings is loss of the discharge. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
these provisions, taken together, require any permission, let alone court 
permissionY0 And furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that the ability of a 
court to allow a claim under section 1305(a) ends with confirmation of the plan. 
After that point (arguably),171 new creditors cannot be added to the plan through the 
modification process. 
("[P]ostpetition consumer creditors ... are to be paid 100% unless the creditor affirmatively consents to 
being paid less than 100%."). 
165 11 U.S.C. § 1328(d) (2006). 
166 See In re Jemison, No. 07-40761, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3107, at *19 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Sept. 6, 2007) 
(noting most debtors will "immediately file another case in which they schedule the unpaid debts left over 
from the dismissed case"). A new petition in chapter 13, however, is subject to a new limit imposed by 
BAPCPA. Under section 1328(f), added by BAPCPA, if the debtor received a general chapter 13 discharge 
(regular or hardship) two years preceding the date of the new chapter 13 case, there cannot be another 
discharge of the post-petition claim against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(2). 
167 See, e.g., In re Turek, 346 B.R. 350, 356 n.9 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2006) ("[Debtors are] required to obtain 
court approval before selling or encumbering their home because it remains property of the estate."). 
168 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(2). 
169 See Carlson, Bankruptcy's Acephalous Moment, supra note 132, at 113-14 ("[T]ransfers in violation of 
the automatic stay are ... void or voidable."). 
170 See In re Jemison, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3107, at * 15 ("There are no restrictions in the Code prohibiting 
a chapter 13 debtor from incurring ordinary consumer debt after the commencement of the case and before 
the debtor is granted a discharge.") (footnote omitted). 
171 I defend this complicated proposition in Carlson, Modification, supra note 83, Pt. V(B). 
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VIL CAUSES OF ACTION 
Suppose, at the time the debtor files a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, the 
bankruptcy estate has within it a cause of action. Who may enforce it? 
Prior to confirmation, the cause of action is property of the estate. The chapter 
13 debtor is entitled to "possess" this cause of action. 172 To bring a lawsuit is to 
"use" this asset. 173 The debtor has the rights and powers, exclusive of the trustee, 
under section 363(b ). Bringing law suits therefore falls under section 363(b ). This 
adds up to a requirement that the debtor must ask court permission to bring a 
lawsuit. 174 
After confirmation, the matter changes. The cause of action is transferred to the 
debtor and, as with other property, the debtor needs no court permission to use 
property that is purely her own. In fact, the trustee is unable to enforce causes of 
action that belong to the debtor alone. 175 
The fact that the debtor may bring pre-petition causes of action after 
confirmation without court permission is a straightforward application of section 
1327(b), which transfers the cause of action back to the debtor. What is not 
recognized, however, is that this same reasoning gives to debtors the right to 
enforce voidable preference and fraudulent conveyance causes of action. These 
causes of action are property of the estate. 
Taken in isolation, section 541(a) is awkward on the question. Under section 
541(a)(3), the estate includes "property that the trustee recovers under section ... 
550 .... "176 And section 550(a) refers to various avoidance theories of a bankruptcy 
trustee. Is the pure cause of action property of the estate, when only that which is 
recovered is mentioned in section 541(a)(3)? This issue has puzzled the courts. 
172 See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) ("Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order confirming a plan, the 
debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate."); Smith v. Rockett, 522 F.3d 1080, 1081 (10th 
Cir. 2008); Cable v. Ivy Tech. State Coll., 200 F.3d 467,473 (7th Cir. 1999). 
173 In re Dawson, 411 B.R. I, 24 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2008) ("[A] debtor in a chapter 13 case is entitled to 
invoke § 363 with respect to the 'use' of a cause of action that is property of the estate."); In re Henneghen, 
No. 03-11853-SSM, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1770, at *21 (Bankr. E.D. Va. June 22, 2005) ("The only way to 
'use' a cause of action is to bring suit upon it or settle it."); In re York, 291 B.R. 806, 8 I 5 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
2003) ("[T]he debtor has the right to bring suit because the debtor has the right to use the property-the 
cause of action that came into the bankruptcy estate."); 124 CONG. REC. H 32,409 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) 
("[C]ertainly it is intended that the debtor has the power to sue and be sued"); Lundin, supra note 10, at § 
47.7. 
174 See In re Dawson, 411 B.R. at 27 n.25; see also Ivy Tech. State Coll., 200 F.3d at 471. But see In re 
Davis, 216 B.R. 898,902 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997). 
175 Black v. United States Postal Serv. (In re Heath), 115 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1997). In In re Frausto, 
259 B.R. 201 (Bankr. N.D. Ala; 2000), a chapter 13 trustee nevertheless pursued a pre-petition cause of 
action and obtained a settlement. Id. at 205. A post-petition creditor of debtor was permitted to garnish 
settlement and take it away from trustee. This was the correct result. Because a plan had been confirmed, the 
debtor owned this asset free and clear of the bankruptcy estate. The post-petition creditor, not subject to the 
automatic stay, was entitled to it, and the chapter 13 trustee was absolutely not entitled to it. 
176 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(3). 
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Cases exist in which fraudulent conveyance theories, at least, are estate property 
under section 541(a)(l).177 In the end, it is rather impossible to assert that causes of 
action arising from non-bankruptcy law are "property," whereas causes of action 
arising under the Bankruptcy Code are not property. If all causes of action are 
property, then, at least prior to confirmation of a reorganization plan, they all fall 
under the jurisdiction of section 363(b ), 178 and they are all transferred to the debtor 
upon confirmation of the plan. 
Suppose we agree that a voidable preference cause of action is property of the 
estate from the moment the bankruptcy petition is filed. May a debtor bring this 
cause of action either before or after confirmation? A majority of courts say no, but 
none of these cases justifies this conclusion in the context of a theory of the chapter 
13 estate. 179 Usually, these cases emphasize that the chapter 13 debtor has limited 
powers of a trustee, and lacks any power to bring avoidance actions. But, if all 
causes of action constitute the use of property of the estate, then the debtor is 
directly authorized to bring avoidance actions. That is because the debtor has the 
"rights and powers" of a trustee under section 363(b ). 180 
This simple point has completely eluded the courts. Most courts hold that the 
debtor can never bring avoidance causes of action. The minority of courts that 
grant standing to the debtor cite pragmatic grounds, 181 overlooking a 
straightforward theory, available from a proper theory of the chapter 13 estate. 
Dawson v. Thomas (In re Dawson/82 addresses these points. In Dawson, a 
chapter 13 debtor wished to bring a pre-petition cause of action, but he needed the 
aid of section 108(a) to do it. Section 108(a) tolls statutes of limitations for 
trustees. Wishing to assert a statute of limitations, the defendant argued that section 
108(a) was not available to a chapter 13 debtor because the debtor is not a trustee. 
Nevertheless, Judge Martin Teel ruled that a debtor could use section 108(a) 
because debtors have "the rights and powers" of a trustee under section 363(b ). 183 
Since lawsuits are brought under section 363(b ), the rights of the trustee included 
the right to a tolling under section 108(a). But, if avoidance actions are property of 
the estate, these too are brought under section 363(b). And, if the debtor has the 
trustee's power under section 108(a), then she likewise has the trustee's power under 
177 See Carlson, Organizing Principle, supra note 38, at 577. 
178 See In re Cohen, 305 B.R. 886, 891 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (requiring court approval for trustee to assign 
avoidance action). 
179 See, e.g., Knapper v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Knapper), 407 F.3d 573, 583 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
chapter 13 debtor's ability to bring action under section 544(b)(l)); Realty Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re 
Hamilton), 125 F.3d 292, 296-97 (5th Cir. 1997) (chapter 13 debtors cannot use section 544 to exercise 
trustees' "strong-arm" avoidance powers). 
180 11 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006). 
181 See In re Ryker, 301 B.R. 156, 161 (D.N.J. 2003) ("The rationale for these cases appears to be a 
pragmatic one, based on the realities of the bankruptcy practice and the Chapter 13 trustee's lack of incentive 
to bring such actions."). 
182 411 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2008). 
183 11 U.S.C. § 1303. 
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sections 547, 548, and the like. 
Yet, inconsistently, Judge Teel endorses the notion that debtors have no standing 
to bring avoidance actions. According to Judge Teel, 
The better reasoned decisions hold that, in contrast to the 
provisions authorizing a chapter 13 debtor to pursue causes of 
action that are property of the estate, none of the provisions of 
chapter 13 authorize a chapter 13 debtor to sue on a trustee's 
avoidance powers . . . . Congress thought that it was inappropriate 
to permit chapter 13 debtors, who are principally consumer debtors, 
to be armed with avoidance powers, and decided that the avoidance 
powers should remain vested in the chapter 13 trustee. This 
explains why Congress elected not to follow the approach of 
chapter 12 of vesting the debtor with all the powers of a chapter 11 
trustee until the debtor is displaced as a debtor in possession, and 
instead resorted to different statutory language for authorizing the 
debtor to invoke a trustee's power to sue on claims that are property 
of the estate. That explanation also lends support to viewing the 
chapter 13 debtor as suing as a trustee for the purposes of§ 108(a) 
when the debtor invokes a trustee's powers under § 363 to sue on a 
cause of action that is property of the estate. 184 
This view makes sense only if avoidance actions are somehow not property of the 
estate. If they are property of the estate, then the debtor may use them under 
section 363(b). Indeed, section 541(a)(3) only makes that which is recovered from 
avoidance actions property of the estate. But, how can it be that a cause of action-
no matter what its source-is not property of the estate? If not, the automatic stay 
does not protect this cause of action. If it is, then this property is under control of 
the debtor in chapter 13 cases. 
If causes of action created by the Bankruptcy Code are property of the estate, 
Judge Teel's distinction cannot hold. If a chapter 13 debtor has access to the 
trustee's power under section 108(a), then how could she not have access to the 
trustee's power to pursue a voidable preference of fraudulent conveyance?185 
A case that approaches the analysis I am advocating without quite reaching it is 
Houston v. Eiler (In re Cohen). 186 In Cohen, the court properly notes that, if 
avoidance actions exist, this must be accounted for in the "best interest of the 
creditors" test. The court imagines a simple hypothetical whereby the bankruptcy 
184 Jn re Dawson, 411 B.R. at 24-25. 
185 In any case, at least one court has held that the chapter 13 trustee can appoint the debtor to bring 
avoidance actions. In re Ryker, 315 B.R 664, 665 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2004) ("[T]he Court finds that the debtor 
may request that the Chapter 13 trustee ratify, join or seek substitution as the plaintiff .... "), ajj'd, No. 06-
1872, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17993 (3d Cir. July 26, 2007). 
186 305 B.R. 886 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004). 
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estate has only one asset-the debtor has made a voidable $100,000 transfer. The 
debtor has but $90,000 in disposable income over the applicable commitment 
period. "It would be an odd system that would require a chapter 13 debtor to iii; 
depend upon the recovery of an avoidable transfer in order to have a confirmable 
plan but not permit the debtor to avoid the transfer," 187 the court remarks. It then 
notes that section 1303 awards certain powers to the debtor (including the power to 
use assets per section 363(b)) and is merely silent as to the avoidance powers. From 
this it follows, apparently, that the trustee and the debtor have concurrent power to 
avoid conveyances. 188 In fact, if the court had simply noticed that any cause of 
action (including any avoidance actions) is estate property usable only pursuant to 
section 1303, it could have found that the debtor has exclusive control over 
avoidance litigation. 
Does this mean that the debtor can pocket the proceeds of avoidance actions? 
Yes, indeed. In the Cohen court's hypothetical, some of the proceeds ($10,000) go 
directly to the creditors. This amount is paid under the province of section 
1322(b )(8), which permits a plan to "provide for the payment of all or part of a 
claim against the debtor from property of the estate or property of the debtor." 189 
Beyond that, section 1325(b )(1) requires that all disposable income be paid into the 
plan. If the debtor has $90,000 of disposable income, then this must be paid into 
the plan, and only $10,000 of non-income assets are being paid into the plan. Ergo, 
the debtor is pocketing $90,000 of the proceeds from the avoidance action. 190 
Misunderstanding its own hypothetical, the Cohen court held otherwise. First, 
it ruled that section 1306(a) outranks section 1327(b)191-contrary to what we said 
here. Ergo, if the debtor recovers proceeds, they are property of the estate. On this 
view, the debtors could use them only with court permission pursuant to section 
363(b ). The court also implies that the creditors always have access to these 
proceeds. 192 But this is not so, unless the proceeds are somehow disposable income. 
Yet the debtor should keep most of the proceeds because they were bought by the 
debtor with post-confirmation wages. 
There is another aspect to the Cohen case that the court overlooked. The case 
involved the debtors' attempt to avoid an unperfected security interest in a payment 
intangible. The debtors were seeking to mount an adversary proceeding against the 
secured creditor, but, in truth, the adversary proceeding was not even necessary. 
The debtors owned the payment intangible free and clear from the mere fact that a 
187 Id. at 897. 
188 See id. at 894 (indicating "legislative history behind § 1303 explains that the list of exclusive powers 
'does not imply that the debtor does not.also possess other powers concurrently with the trustee" (citing 124 
CONG. REC. 32,409 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978))). 
189 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8) (2006). 
190 In In re Cohen, the proceeds were expressly committed to fund the plan. 305 B.R. at 898. 
191 Id. at 898. 
192 See id. ("The transferee, as the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, could even request modification 
of an existing confirmed plan to provide for payment of the recovery to creditors."). 
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chapter 13 plan was confirmed. This result is dictated by state law, to which 
bankruptcy law must comply. · 
To see why, let us leave the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and consider 
the basic relationship between a debtor, an unperfected secured creditor and a 
person who becomes a lien creditor while the security interest is unperfected. This 
consideration is important because a bankruptcy trustee is just such a lien creditor, 
both under the UCC193 and under the Bankruptcy Code. 194 
In Cohen, the debtors borrowed money from a secured creditor ( call her SP) 
and granted SP a security interest in a tort cause of action. So the defendant in the 
tort case was what Article 9 calls an account debtor (and whom I will call AD). SP 
had an obligation to file a financing statement to perfect its security in this payment 
intangible, but it failed to do so. 195 Suppose now that one of the unsecured creditors 
of the debtor ( call her JC) obtains a money judgment and that, pursuant to a writ of 
execution, the sheriff garnishes AD. Under Article 9, JC has become a lien creditor 
and is senior to AD.196 AD must, therefore, pay JC in lieu of the plaintiff-debtor. 
Now consider that JC is precisely the equivalent of the chapter 13 trustee. This 
means that AD must pay the bankruptcy estate in case it is liable for the tort. This 
right to payment from AD is transferred to the debtors by section 1327(b). So, 
without the need of any adversary proceeding, AD already had the obligation to pay 
the debtors in Cohen. This is because the strong-arm power is self-executing, both 
in and out of chapter 13. At least one court has recognized this expressly. 197 
Some chapter 11 cases have addressed the effect of confirmation on avoidance 
actions. Section 1123(b)(3)(B) directly authorizes a plan that delegates to post-
confirmation debtors the right to bring avoidance actions. 198 But courts sometimes 
hold that the chapter 11 plan must explicitly assign avoidance actions to the debtor: 
We view § 1123(b)(3) as, at least in part, a notice provision. 
Creditors have the right to know of any potential causes of action 
that might enlarge the estate-and that could be used to increase 
payment to the creditors .... Compliance with § 1123(b )(3) gives 
193 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52)(C) (2005) ("'[L]ien creditor' means ... a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of 
the filing of the petition."). 
194 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (2006) ("The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, ... the 
rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the 
debtor that is voidable by ... a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of 
the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on 
which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor 
exists."). 
195 See In re Cohen, 305 B.R. at 904. 
196 See Citibank, N.A. v. Prime Motor Inns Ltd. P'ship, 780 N.E.2d 503, 504 (N.Y. 2002). 
197 See In re Robertson, 232 B.R. 846, 852-53 (Bank. D. Md. 1999). 
198 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (2006); Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.), 375 
F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2004); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 
F.3d 548, 579 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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notice of that intent. 199 
Courts have also denied the debtor a right to sue because, according to section 
550(a), avoidance actions can only be brought "for the benefit of the estate.11200 If 
there is no estate after confirmation, then it supposedly follows that the debtor 
cannot recover for herself. This attempt to deny standing to the debtor does not 
work. It is fairly clear that a trustee need not proceed under section 550(a) in order 
to prosecute an avoidance action. Voidable preference actions can proceed under 
section 551 or can be free-standing. Congress itself has acknowledged this 
position.201 If so, "benefit of the estate" must fall out of the equation. 
In any case, if the trustee sells a cause of action to a third party for 
consideration, the estate benefits from the sales proceeds. Even though the buyer 
keeps the proceeds of the cause of action, the estate benefits by the buyer's action 
because, unless the buyer can take title to the avoidance action, there will be no 
market for such causes of action. 
A chapter 13 debtor, in effect, buys all causes of action through the "best 
interest of the creditors" test. This test must include in the value of the estate the 
present value of all causes of action, including avoidance actions. Indeed, if these 
avoidance causes of action are not transferred to the debtor, they ought not to be 
included in the bankruptcy estate for the purposes of the "best interest of the 
creditors" test. Excluding these assets from the test lowers the minimum a debtor 
must pay to the detriment of creditors ( and therefore, at some level, to the detriment 
of the bankruptcy estate). 
Furthermore, if a debtor buys an avoidance action from the bankruptcy estate 
through the "best interest of the creditors" test, then creditors are entitled to capture 
any capital gain above and beyond the valuation attributed to the valuation. 
Suppose, for example, that the right to recover a :fraudulent conveyance is valued at 
$100. The debtor buys this cause of action with post-confirmation disposable 
income. Later, the debtor recovers $150 at the cost of $5. The debtor has enjoyed a 
capital gain of $45, which the creditors may capture through plan modification.202To 
summarize, the theory of the chapter 13 estate espoused here supports the notion 
that, at least after confirmation, the debtor has standing to bring avoidance causes of 
199 Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898,903 (8th Cir. 1994). 
200 Id. 
201 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(i) (2006). By way of background, the Seventh Circuit alarmed commercial lawyers 
by holding that any creditor with an insider guarantor was subject to the one-year voidable preference period 
to which insiders are subjected. In so ruling, the court, interpreted section 550(a). Levit v. Ingersoll Rand 
Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1989). In 1994, Congress amended section 550(a) in an attempt 
to save assured creditors from this one-year period. But, soon it was discovered that the same result could be 
generated from section 547 itself, without any reference to section 550(a). See Steve H. Nickles, Deprizio 
Dead Yet? Birth, Wounding, and Another Attempt to Kill the Case, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2001). 
BAPCPA added section 547(i) to kill off this idea once and for all. Ergo, Congress agrees that avoidance 
actions do not depend on section 550(a). 
202 Carlson, Modification, supra note 83, at Pt. III. 
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action, as well as state-law causes of action that are part of the bankruptcy estate at 
the time of confirmation. Many courts have denied a chapter 13 debtor's standing to 
bring avoidance actions, but if it is admitted that the debtor has standing to bring 
any cause of action after confirmation of a plan, it must also be admitted that the 
debtor has standing to bring causes of action created by the Bankruptcy Code. It 
may seem odd that a debtor can avoid a fraudulent conveyance she herself made,203 
but, under chapter 13 theory, she has bought this privilege by paying all disposable 
income in exchange for ownership of the chapter 13 estate. 
VIII. EXEMPTIONS 
Exempt property is an important consideration in a chapter 13 case but only 
indirectly. Exemptions must be considered in the "best interest of the creditors" 
test, 204 where a hypothetical liquidation dividend must be generated in order to set a 
minimum plan payment.205 This involves reducing the hypothetically liquidated 
estate by the value of exempt property. 
Many conclude that, beyond this indirect consideration, exemptions are 
superfluous. The meaning of an exemption is that the exempt item is expelled from 
the bankruptcy estate in favor of the debtor.206 If confirmation of a plan means that 
all property of the estate is transferred to the debtor, then it may seem that 
exemptions are superfluous. Except for the wages paid by the debtor to the chapter 
13 trustee,207 "there [is] no estate from which the property could be exempted.11208 
What's the sense in exempting things from property of the estate when the debtor 
already owns these things, thanks to confirmation of the plan?209 Indeed, one 
appellate panel has ruled that, after confirmation, a bankruptcy court has no 
jurisdiction to rule on an objection to a claimed exemption.210 
In fact, exempt property is relevant to a chapter 13 debtor, even beyond the 
203 This phenomenon has long been an acknowledged irony in chapter 11 cases. See Belisle v. Plunkett, 
877 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1989) (avoiding constructive trust in real property where debtor was wrongdoer). 
204 See Armstrong v. Lindberg (In re Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 1984); see also In re 
Campbell, 313 B.R. 313, 321 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004); In re Walker, 153 B.R. 565, 569 n.2 (Bankr. D. Or. 
1993); James B. McLaughlin, Jr., Lien Avoidance by Debtors in Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 45, 53 (1984). 
205 Exemptions in this environment have been called "academic exemptions," in contrast with real 
exemptions, where property is expelled from the bankruptcy estate. In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722, 726 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1995). 
206 See Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1990) ("An exemption is an interest withdrawn from the estate 
(and hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the debtor."). 
207 See In re Thompson, 142 B.R. 961, 964 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (observing debtors "provide ... only so 
much of their earnings" to trustee as is necessary to execute confirmation plan). 
208 Lindberg v. Lindberg (In re Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 1984); see also In re Stinson, 27 
B.R 18, 20 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ,r 1300, at 1300-81 (Alan N. Resnick et al. 
eds., 15th ed. rev. 2006) (alteration in original). 
209 See In re Brown, 375 B.R. 362, 376 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007); In re Walker, 153 B.R. at 569. 
210 In re Campbell, 313 B.R. 313,316 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004). 
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indirect impact on the "best interest of the creditors" test. The act of expulsion is 
not all that the bankruptcy exemptions mean. Section 522( c) is a substantive rule 
governing the exempt items following expulsion. 
According to section 522(c), exempt property is "not liable during or after the 
case for any debt of the debtor that arose ... before the commencement of the 
case. "211 Thus, even if a debtor is denied a discharge, the debtor may still retain the 
exempt property from pre-petition creditors. Often this does not matter. Where 
property is exempt under nonbankruptcy law, pre-petition creditors are stymied 
regardless of section 522( c ). But, the Bankruptcy Code provides federal 
exemptions, which may not prove homeomorphic to nonbankruptcy exemptions. 
Also, states have occasionally created exemptions that are valid in bankruptcy, but 
nowhere else.212 Section 522(c) protects exemptions, which are unique to 
bankruptcy, but otherwise would be vulnerable to the sheriff under state law. 
A key exception in section 522( c) is that, if the property is encumbered by a 
pre-petition lien, the property remains encumbered by that lien once the exempt 
item is expelled from the bankruptcy estate.213 But, where that lien is a judicial lien 
or a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest on certain designated 
property,214 section 522(f) provides an opportunity for the debtor to avoid the lien to 
the extent it impairs the exemption. Unless these liens are avoided, the debtor is 
compelled to give cram down rights to the creditors.215 
On the other hand, suppose the bankruptcy estate does not end at confirmation. 
In other words, suppose section 1306(a) outranks section 1327(b). In that case, 
exemption (in the expulsion sense) is entirely relevant in chapter 13. This was 
implicitly the position taken recently by the Seventh Circuit in In re Willett,216 
where a debtor sought to avoid a judicial lien in the post-confirmation period. 
The Willett cases added a complex wrinkle. At the time the debtors filed for 
bankruptcy, the debtor had only a remainder interest in their residence. The life 
211 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(l) (2006). 
212 See, e.g., N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 282(2) (2006). For details on this provision, see, David Gray 
Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment (Part Two: Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST. JOHN'S L. 
REV. 43, 218-20 (2009). Some courts view "bankruptcy only" exemptions as unconstitutional. See infra text 
accompanying note 233 for further discussion on unconstitutionality of exemptions. 
213 An exception is also made for nondischargeable tax and domestic claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(l) 
(2006). 
214 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l). On these avoidable security interests, see generally David Gray Carlson, 
Security Interests on Exempt Property After the 1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 57 (1996) [hereinafter Carlson, Security Interests on Exempt Property]. 
215 See LUNDIN, supra note 10, at§ 50.1; McLaughlin, supra note 203, at 64-67. On this basis, at least one 
court of appeals has ruled that the chapter 13 trustee has standing to object to a proof of a secured claim to 
the extent the lien in question violates section 522(t). See Tower Loan of Miss., Inc. v. Maddox (In re 
Maddox), 15 F.3d 1347, 1355-56 (5th Cir. 1994). Read straight up, section 522(t) grants the avoidance 
power only to the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l) (2006) ("Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions but 
subject to paragraph (3), the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in 
proRerty .... "). 
2 6 544 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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estate was held by the mother of one of the debtors. Technically, at the time of 
bankruptcy, the debtors were merely licensees in their residence with no other right 
of possession while their mother lived. Beyond this license (revocable at the will of 
the mother-in-law), the debtors owned a mere future interest.217 Only the future 
interest was encumbered by a judicial lien. 
After bankruptcy, the mother conveyed her life estate to the debtors, so that they 
had fee simple absolute. The debtors then sought to avoid a judicial lien based on 
the value of the remainder interest as of the time of the bankruptcy petition. On 
appeal, however, the court ruled that the debtors must use the fee simple interest to 
calculate the amount of lien avoidance. 
This strikes me as wrong. The judicial lien in question encumbers the 
remainder interest only. The life estate is post-petition property that belongs to the 
debtors alone. To this the judicial lien could never attach. It is a violation of the 
automatic stay for a lien to be created against property of the debtor.218 Furthermore, 
if a discharge is appropriate, the pre-petition judgment is void under section 524(a), 
thereby, preventing any future lien arising from that judgment from ever attaching. 
If I have this right, then the life estate is not encumbered by the judicial lien, but 
the remainder interest (nested within the bankruptcy estate) is. Now, as is true in 
most states, Indiana's homestead exemption has a monetary limit.219 It seems to me, 
that the exemption may be used to protect the much less valuable remainder 
interest, which therefore must be valued separately. If, after avoidance, some 
amount of lien survives, the post-petition lien enables the creditor to sell only the 
remainder. The debtors' life estate pur autre vie is not exempt property, but after 
discharge, the life estate is off limits to the pre-petition creditors with dischargeable 
claims.220 
According to the valuations used by the lower courts in Willett, the remainder 
interest of the debtors at the time of the chapter 13 petition was $65,000. The value 
of the fee simple absolute at the time of the life estate was conveyed to the debtors 
was $95,000. The low~r courts assumed that only the remainder was relevant, and 
that it should be valued as of the time of the bankruptcy petition. This roughly 
coheres with the DT. According to section 522(a)(2), value "means fair market 
value as of the date of the filing of the petition or, with respect to property that 
217 Id. at 789. Indiana Code section 34-55-10-2 exempts real estate "constituting the personal or family 
residence of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or estates or rights in that real estate ... of not more 
than [$15,000]." IND. CODE§ 34-55-10-2(c)(l) (2008). 
218 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (2006). One difficulty: with regard to the after-acquired property effect of a 
judicial lien, what "act" has the creditor committed that violates this provision? Perhaps the debtors' receipt 
of the life estate (which automatically results in the judicial lien) is an "act" within the meaning of section 
362(a)(4). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (referring to "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against 
proRerty of the estate"). 
2 9 See In re Willett, 544 F.3d at 790 (noting at time of Willetts' bankruptcy, Indiana exemption for married 
coufle was $15,000). 
22 It is, however, a gift and, therefore, post-confirmation disposable income, which the creditors may 
capture in a plan modification. See Carlson, Modification, supra note 83, at Pt. IIl(B). 
2009] THE CHAPTER 13 ESTATE 273 
becomes property of the estate after such date, as of the date such property becomes 
property of the estate. "221 One would have thought that valuation as of the time of 
lien avoidance is the better choice, but that is not what section 522(a)(2) provides. 
On appeal, the court held that the life estate, granted post-petition, must be 
joined with the remainder to compose a fee simple absolute estate. Accordingly, the 
$95,000 value (assessed at a time later than the bankruptcy petition) had to be used 
for calculating the avoidance amount. This conclusion can only be true if 
confirmation of the plan does not terminate the bankruptcy estate. In such a case, 
the bankruptcy estate includes both the pre-petition remainder interest and the post-
petition life estate. 
In fact, even on the erroneous theory of the chapter 13 estate, the value should 
have been less than $95,000. Part of the property was the remainder. As to the 
remainder, the timing rule of section 522(a)(2) points to the time of the petition. At 
that time, the remainder's value not only had to be valued in a softer real estate 
rriarket, but the remainder's value was depressed because the life estate was (at that 
time) comparatively longer. Two years later, the life estate was less valuable 
because the life of the mother was shorter. Therefore, even though the life estate 
and the remainder joined together to create a fee simple absolute estate, the 
applicable value is based on the separate parts-a less valuable remainder and a less 
valuable life estate. (This, of course, assumes that the judicial lien actually attaches 
to the life estate, which of course is wrong.) 
Although the Willett court did not expressly articulate a theory of the chapter 13 
estate, the result reached can only be comprehended if section 1306(a) outranks 
section 1327(b ). Willett therefore sub silentio overrules earlier cases such as Black 
v. United States Postal Service (In re Heath),222 which correctly theorized the nature 
of the chapter 13 estate. 
IX. GARNISHING THE DEBTOR 
The theory of the chapter 13 estate has been invoked when one of the creditors 
provided for under the plan is herself a debtor (not in bankruptcy) and a creditor of 
that creditor seeks to garnish the debtor or the chapter 13 trustee of the bankrupt 
debtor. 
In In re Root,223 the debtor's lawyer owed taxes. The IRS, therefore, levied the 
debtor (who ironically was an employee of the IRS). Not afraid to bite the hand 
that feeds him, the debtor sought sanctions against the IRS for violating the 
automatic stay. The court denied the debtor's motion, but only after theorizing the 
chapter 13 estate. According to the court, there must be a chapter 13 estate after 
confirmation. 
221 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (2006). 
222 115 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 1997). 
223 61 B.R. 984 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986). 
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If there is no estate over which the Chapter 13 Trustee has control, 
then that Trustee is nothing more than an officious intermeddler. 
Even 11 U.S.C. § 704(9) (made applicable to Chapter 13 Trustees 
by 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(l)), provides that the Trustee shall " ... 
make a final report and file a final account of the administration of 
the estate [ emphasis added] with the court." There must be an 
"estate" upon and after confirmation, and that estate consists of the 
property and future earnings of the debtor dedicated to fulfillment 
of the Chapter 13 Plan.224 
This much-quoted comment is unnecessary to the result. Under the plan, the debtor 
does not owe the legal fee directly to his lawyer. Rather, the debtor owes the 
chapter 13 trustee, who in turn owes the debtor's lawyer. The proper garnishee in 
this case is the chapter 13 trustee. Nevertheless, the court's remark is off the mark. 
Yes, there is a bankruptcy estate-what the debtor successfully transmits to the 
chapter 13 trustee. As to these funds, the trustee can write a report at the end of the 
case.
225 The requirement of reportage does not entail the view that the debtor's 
wages are property of the chapter 13 estate after confirmation. Only wages 
successfully conveyed to the chapter 13 trustee are property of the estate. The IRS 
should have garnished the chapter 13 trustee, not the debtor. 
In Laughlin v. US. Internal Revenue Service, 226 the IRS levied a chapter 13 
trustee for taxes owed by a bankruptcy attorney. The trustee owed the attorney 
distributions from three different cases. Properly, the IRS was held not guilty of 
violating the automatic stay. The levy neither affected the debtor, nor interfered 
with the debtor's payment of wages to the trustee in any way. It simply diverted the 
funds from the taxpayer to the IRS, as IRS levies are supposed to do. 227 This case 
correctly theorizes garnishing the bankruptcy estate. 
X. THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE IN CASES CONVERTED TO CHAPTER 7 
A. Conversion as a Transfer of Debtor Property 
A final consideration is the fate of the chapter 13 estate in a conversion to 
224 Id. at 985; see In re Leavell, 190 B.R. 536, 539-40 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (discussing multiple reasons 
whri estate continues to exist upon confirmation of chapter 13 plan). 
2 5 West Va. State Tax Dep't v. Mullins (In re Mullins), No. 2:00-6571. 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 90691, at* 
17 (S.D.W. Va Sept. 30, 2009). 
226 912 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 (1991). 
227 For a view that the IRS violated the stay in Laughlin, see Michaela M. White, The Effects of Chapter 13 
Plan Confirmation and Case Conversion on Property, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 785, 807 (1993). Such a view 
is untenable. The IRS levy is in no way inconsistent with the plan. If the plan calls for the attorney to be paid 
and if the IRS garnishes this amount because the attorney has not paid taxes, the attorney's claim is 
extinguished,just as the plan calls for. See 26 U.S.C. § 6332(e) (2006). 
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chapter 7. According to Bankruptcy Code section 348(f)(l): 
Except as provided in paragraph (2), when a case under Chapter 13 
of this title is converted to a case under another chapter under this 
title--
(A) property of the estate in the converted case shall consist 
of the property of the estate, as of the date of filing of the 
petition, that remains in the possession of or is under the 
control of the debtor on the date of conversion .... 228 
275 
Under the DT, confirmation of a chapter 13 plan transfers the bankruptcy estate to 
the debtor. A good faith conversion to chapter 7229 is a new transfer of debtor 
property to the chapter 7 trustee. But not all debtor property is transferred. 
Pursuant to section 348(f)(l)(A), the debtor transfers only property that historically 
was property of the estate on the day of the bankruptcy petition. Any property the 
debtor may have conveyed away prior to the conversion is not property of the 
estate. 
What of property the chapter 13 trustee possesses? This is genuinely property 
of the estate after confirmation of the chapter 13 plan. According to section 
1326(a), a debtor must commence payments to the trustee even before a plan is 
confirmed. If a plan is not confirmed, the trustee is instructed to return the funds to 
the debtor,230 after deducting administrative claims on the estate.231 If.a plan is 
confirmed, the trustee is instructed to distribute the funds to the creditors pursuant 
to the plan. The one thing the chapter 13 trustee must not do is to give these funds 
to the chapter 7 trustee.232 
A startling interpretation of section 348(f)(l) is In re Brown.233 In this case, a 
228 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(l) ( emphasis added). 
229 On bad faith debtors, see infra text accompanying notes 265-97. 
230 See Stamm v. Morton (In re Stamm), 222 F.3d 216,218 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[D]ebtor's wages, earned after 
the filing of their Chapter 13 petition and before discharge under Chapter 7, are not part of the Chapter 7 
estate."); see also In re Crews, No. 06-10338, 2007 Barna. LEXIS 2277, at *8 (Barna. S.D. Ala. June 26, 
2007) ("[T]he legislative history of Section 348(f)(l)(A) expresses congressional intent that property 
acquired after commencement of a chapter 13 case but prior to conversion to a chapter 7 does not constitute 
property of the estate."). A contrary case is Resendez v. Lindquist, 691 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1982). This case, 
however, precedes the 1994 enactment of section 348(f)(l) and, therefore, must be considered overruled. In 
Resendez, the chapter 7 trustee had possession of the funds in question already. The debtor then attempted to 
claim that these funds were exempt. The court ruled that, since the debtor voluntarily paid the wages to the 
chapter 13 trustee, the debtor forfeited any exemption in the property that the chapter 7 trustee had 
recovered. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(l)(A) (2006) (indicating debtor may exempt transferred property if such 
transfer was not voluntary). 
231 See 11 U.S.C. § 1326(c) (2006). This would include claims by the debtor's attorney. Section 503(b)(2) 
defines as an administrative claim "compensation and reimbursement awarded under section 330(a) of this 
title." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2). Section 330(a)(4)(B) directly mentions the debtor's attorney in chapter 13 
cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
232 See In re Pegues, 266 B.R. 328, 332 (Barna. D. Md. 2001). 
233 375 B.R. 362 (Barna. W.D. Mich. 2007). 
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chapter 13 debtor listed his house as exempt under Michigan's bankruptcy-only 
exemption. Judge Jeffrey Hughes had recently declared such exemptions to be 
unconstitutional.234 Nevertheless, the chapter 13 trustee did not object to the 
exemption. A plan was confirmed and later went into default. The case was 
converted to chapter 7. The chapter 7 trustee wished to challenge the exemption. 
The debtor claimed that, under Rule 4003(b ), the trustee had to challenge an 
exemption "within 30 days after the meeting of creditors held under § 341(a) is 
concluded .... "235 More than 30 days had allegedly passed since the chapter 13 
creditors' meeting was closed, according to the debtor.236 The trustee, in turn, argued 
that, since a second creditors' meeting must be called in the converted chapter 7 
case, the trustee had 30 days after that meeting to challenge the exemption. 
In a learned opinion, Judge Hughes opined that the trustee had a second chance, 
but in the end, he ruled that, even though the house could not be exempted, the 
debtor could keep the house nevertheless. 
Why? Because section 348(f)(l)(A) brings only property of the estate at the 
time of the conversion into chapter 7. The house ceased to be property of the estate 
when the plan was converted. Therefore, section 348(f)(l) did not apply. In short, 
Judge Hughes thought that, in converted chapter 7 cases, one does not ask whether 
the debtor's property was historically property of the estate at the time of the 
bankruptcy petition. Rather, one asks whether, at the time of conversion, the 
property was indeed the debtor's property. If the answer is yes, the chapter 7 trustee 
cannot have it. 237 
So, in Brown, the debtor was able to keep his house, even though it was not 
exempt. But, Judge Hughes cautioned: 
[T]he bad news for Debtor is that the ... residence is not entitled to 
the protection afforded by Section 522( c) because the residence was 
234 See In re Wallace, 347 B.R. 626, 635 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006). 
235 In re Brown, 375 B.R. 362, 366 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006). 
236 The record was unclear whether the chapter 13 creditors' meeting was ever closed. Id. at 365-66. 
237 Id. at 374 n.22 ("While a subsequent Chapter 7 trustee would in theory have a second opportunity to 
object to the exemptions the debtor had previously claimed were the case later converted to a Chapter 7, the 
Chapter 7 trustee would not be able to actually take advantage of that opportunity because of the debtor's 
already successful exemption of that interest prior to the case being converted"). Judge Hughes compares the 
debtor's property to the law of gravity: 
Think of property status as being like gravity and Rule 4003(b) as being a road sign. 
Both a road sign and Rule 4003(b) give direction. However, as helpful as a road sign 
may be, the traveler must still give heed to the inconvenience of gravity, especially 
when the road sign leads to the edge of a cliff. The same deference must be given to the 
status of property vis-a-vis the bankruptcy estate when seeking guidance from Rule 
4033(b). 
Id. at 375. I take this difficult metaphor to mean that just because Rule 4003(b) points in the direction 
towards recovery does not prove there will be a recovery because recovery violates natural law (the law of 
gravity). 
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not "exempted" from the bankruptcy estate by operation of Section 
522(/), but was rather simply removed at a later date through the 
confirmation process.238 
277 
Section 522( c) states that exempted property is off limits to pre-petition creditors. 
But, pace Judge Hughes, loss of section 522( c) is of no consequence whatsoever, in 
the typical case. The automatic stay prevents any pre-petition creditor from "any 
act to create ... against property of the debtor any lien .... "239 As for post-petition 
creditors, section 348(d) provides that their claims "shall be treated for all purposes 
as if such claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of the 
petition.240 Section 348(d) means that post-petition creditors are subject to the 
automatic stay (just like the pre-petition creditors) and are subject to discharge in 
the chapter 7 case.241 
Ironically, if the debtor had stayed in chapter 13, the post-petition creditors 
would not have been subject to the automatic stay and therefore, would have access 
to the house. Or, if the debtor had started in chapter 7 and if the house had been 
exempt, the post-petition creditors would have had access to the house, since 
section 522( c) does not apply to post-petition creditors. Or, since the house was not 
exempt, if the debtor had started in chapter 7, the pre-petition creditors would have 
obtained the house to the exclusion of the post-petition creditors, through the 
bankruptcy liquidation process. But because he started in chapter 13 and then 
ended up in chapter 7, the debtor kept the house from both the pre-petition and the 
post-petition debtors.242 
Judge Hughes imagines that the case would be different if the plan itself 
238 Id at 382. 
239 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (2006). The automatic stay also applies to prevent "any act to collect a claim 
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case .... " 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(5). 
240 11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (2006). 
241 Judge Hughes seemed to think that section 522(c) empowers pre-petition creditors to obtain the house: 
[T]he debtor's failure ... to exempt ... in his prior Chapter 13, coupled with his 
successful removal of ... [the exempt property] through the subsequent confirmation of 
his Chapter 13 plan, would have left ... [the exempt property] "liable ... for any debt . 
. . that arose ... before the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 522(c). Indeed, 
this would be so even though the debtor himself would be protected from those same 
pre-petition debts through the separate Section 524(a)(2) injunction issued post-
conversion in conjunction with his Chapter 7 discharge. 
In re Brown, 375 B.R. at 377. This does not follow. Section 522(c) does not create an enforcement right. 
Rather, a pre-petition creditor would have to obtain a money judgment. This is precisely what the discharge 
injunction in section 524(a)(2) prevents. Also, pre-petition judgments are dissolved. See 11 U.S.C. § 
524(a)(l) (2006). The injunction prevents the pre-petition creditor from starting over. 
242 A further paradox: Judge Hughes in In re Brown, 375 B.R. at 380 n.28, adopts the after-acquired 
property theory I have criticized. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96. Therefore, if the debtor had 
moved into the house after confirmation, then the house goes into the converted chapter 7 estate, where both 
the pre-petition and post-petition creditors could get it. 
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provided that property of the estate would not revest in the debtor, in spite of 
section 1327(b). Indeed, section 1322(b)(9) invites (but does not require) "vesting 
of property of the estate, on confirmation of the plan or at a later time, in the debtor 
or in any other entity. "243 And, we have seen, dubiously, the courts have forced anti-
vesting language on a debtor in a confirmation order, even though the debtor is 
supposed to be the author of the plan. If such a plan term had existed, then, if the 
house was listed as exempt on the debtor's Schedule C, the house would have been 
exempted from the chapter 13 estate. And, as the chapter 13 trustee did not object 
to the exemption by the Rule 4003 deadline, the house would have been beyond the 
reach of the chapter 7 estate. Although Judge Hughes thought the chapter 7 trustee 
had a second shot at objecting to the exemption, it would have been to no avail.244 
Once it is out of the estate, whether by exemption or confirmation, the house does 
not come back to the chapter 7 estate, because section 348(±)(1) applies only to 
"property of the estate" as it exists as of the time of the conversion.245 
This is at least the result where the debtor claims that the entire house is 
exempt-what Judge Hughes calls an "in-kind exemption. "246 The debtor, in Brown, 
however, modestly claimed a mere monetary exemption in the house. In that case, 
the house is part in and part out of the chapter 7 estate. If we view the trustee as a 
lien creditor on the house,247 then the trustee could sell the house and retain the 
surplus over valid liens and over the monetary exemption.248 
But, wasn't Judge Hughes of the opinion that the chapter 7 trustee had a second 
shot under Rule 4003 to object to an exemption? It turns out that, given Judge 
Hughes's theory of the chapter 13 estate and of section 348(±)(1), the trustee's 
second shot at an objection always fails. Either confirmation of the chapter 13 case 
destroys the chapter 7 trustee's case or, if, 30 days after the chapter 13 creditors' 
meeting is closed, the chapter 13 trustee never objected to the exemption, the 
property is expelled from the estate and never comes back. In either case, Judge 
Hughes might as well have said that the trustee's second chance doesn't exist. 
243 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(9) (2006). 
244 See In re Brown, 375 B.R. at 382 ("Therefore, it makes no difference that the Chapter 7 trustee now has 
a renewed opportunity to object .... "). 
245 And, of course, even some of this property (if any) is expelled from the chapter 7 estate because section 
348(f)(l) exonerates any property the debtor acquired after the bankruptcy petition was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 
348~ f)(l) (2006). 
24 In re Brown, 375 B.R. at 382 n.30. 
247 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (2006). 
248 By the way, where in the Bankruptcy Code does it say that, in the case of a monetary exemption, if the 
trustee sells the property, the debtor gets the monetary equivalent of the exemption? Once the exempt 
property is liquidated, the trustee holds cash. But, cash is not necessarily exempt. Where state-law 
exemptions are used, one would have to find a "proceeds" theory within state law itself See In re Williams, 
337 B.R. 846, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (tracing permitted under liberal interpretation of Virginia law). 
Such principles can be elusive. See also Carlson, Security Interests on Exempt Property, supra note 214, at 
218-20 (discussing New York law). Nevertheless, courts assume without analysis that debtors are always 
entitled to cash proceeds where an exempt item is sold by the trustee. See, e.g., In re Brown, 375 B.R. at 372 
(remarking exempt car's sale proceeds goes to debtor). 
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In a different In re Brown,249 Judge John Cook more directly denied the chapter 
7 "burial" trustee a second chance to object to an exemption. He reasoned that 
exemptions meant expelling property from the bankruptcy estate. Objecting to an 
expulsion after it has occurred is useless. At this point, the trustee needs an 
avoidance theory, which the Bankruptcy Code fails to give.250 Ergo, if exemption is 
achieved under another chapter (here, chapter 11 ), it is too late in the converted 
chapter 7 case for the trustee to prevent what has already occurred. 
This view of exemptions is quite unnecessary. A signed and delivered deed to 
Blackacre expels Blackacre from the owner's estate. But if the deed was procured 
by fraud or was executed without capacity, then the deed produces only a voidable 
title. The transferee holds legal title in trust for the transferor. Likewise, if an 
exemption is procured by fraud or without capacity, the exempt property is held in 
trust for the bankruptcy trustee. True, the objection procedure is irrelevant to a 
constructive trust theory, but the trustee can simply bring a turnover order to recover 
the legal title.251 
In Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,252 a debtor listed an obviously non-exempt asset 
in a straight chapter 7 case. The trustee did not object because the asset did not 
seem valuable. Later, it proved to be valuable. The trustee argued that he could 
recover the asset's proceeds because "the debtor did not have a good-faith or 
reasonably disputable basis for claiming it. "253 The court responded to this argument 
by emphasizing that deadlines are deadlines and the trustee was too late. The court 
also refused to consider any argument based on the notorious section 105(a),254 
because the meaning of this provision was not raised by the trustee in the lower 
courts. (The Supreme Court--our court of lazy resort-declines to investigate 
alternative grounds to uphold the decision of the lower court.) Therefore, it is an 
easy matter, in a case where section 105(a) may be considered, to hold that a debtor 
holds the wrongly exempted property in trust pending its recovery by the 
bankruptcy trustee.255 
249 178 B.R. 722, 724 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995). 
250 See In re Halbert, 146 B.R. 185, 189 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) ("If the property has already been 
removed from the estate at some distant point in the past, a current objection in the Chapter 7 would not 
apriear to be a proceeding which would 'recover' the property."). 
51 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2006) (mandating property or its value be turned over to trustee). 
252 503 U.S. 638 (1992). 
253 Id. at 639. 
254 According to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a): 
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to 
carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising 
of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua 
sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to 
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process. 
255 See Barroso-Herrans v. Lugo-Mender (In re Barroso-Herrans), 524 F.3d 341, 344 (1st Cir. 2008); 
Nardei v. Maughan (In re Maughan), 340 F.3d 337, 341-42, 344 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Williams, 337 B.R. 
!1 
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In any event, the nature of a converted case has.to be that conversion constitutes 
a transfer of all the debtor's property to the chapter 7 "burial" trustee. Therefore, to 
the extent the debtor still possesses the exempted item, it is transferred back to the 
chapter 7 trustee, and the debtor will have to claim the exempted item all over 
again. At that time, the trustee can object to the exemption effectively, if she has 
good grounds. 256 
B. Proceeds 
Section 348(±)(1) prevents property acquired by a debtor after a bankruptcy 
petition from entering the chapter 7 estate. This is a rare moment where a 
congressional amendment of the Bankruptcy Code has benefited consumer 
debtors.257 If it were not for section 348(±)(1), then all of a debtor's property would 
enter the chapter 7 estate. The exemption procedure would have to be invoked all 
over agam. 
What does go into the converted chapter 7 estate is debtor property that the 
debtor still possesses and that was property of the estate historically at the time of 
the bankruptcy petition. 
If this principle is taken seriously, then proceeds of what historically was 
property of the estate do not go to the chapter 7 trustee. Although it is easy to 
forget, proceeds are, strictly speaking, after-acquired property. For this reason, 
when section 552(a) strikes down after-acquired property clauses in pre-petition 
security agreements, section 552(b) saves proceeds from the effects of this 
invalidation. This was done precisely because proceeds are always after-acquired 
property. 
Article 9 scholars sometimes forget this point. According to old section 9-
846, 850 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005). 
256 Judge Cook, in In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995), denies this theory of the converted 
case. He asserts that, in a case converted from chapter 11, where section 348(f)(l) does not apply, none of 
the debtor's assets is transferred to the converted bankruptcy estate. See id. at 727-28. For this proposition, 
he cites Still v. Rossville Bank (In re Chattanooga Wholesale Antiques, Inc.), 930 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1991). 
Chattanooga, however, concerned whether post-confirmation payments actually made could be recovered in 
the converted chapter 7 case. The answer was, properly, no. See id. at 461-62, 465. The case says nothing 
about the fate of debtor property not transferred to third parties. Judge Cook's principle guarantees that in 
chaJ?ter 11 and chapter 12 conversions, the burial trustee never gets any assets at all. 
2 Section 348(f)(l) was designed to legislate the result in Bobrojf v. Cont'/ Bank (In re Bobrojj), 766 F.2d 
797 (3d Cir. 1985). In this case, a post-petition tort claim owned by the debtor was held not part of the 
converted chapter 7 estate: 
If debtors must take the risk that property acquired during the course of an attempt at 
repayment will have to be liquidated for the benefit of creditors if chapter 13 proves 
unavailing ... no reason of policy suggests itself why the creditors should not be put 
back in precisely the same position as they would have been had the debtor never 
sought to repay his debts .... 
Id. at 803 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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306(2), a security interest "continues in[to]"258 proceeds. This led some to suppose 
that the original collateral and the proceeds are the same thing. This is what 
continuity implies. But, even the briefest consideration reveals that, where the 
original collateral is a diamond ring and the proceeds are cash, the ring and the cash 
are two different things, notthe same thing.259 The ring and the cash have different 
time-space coordinates and chemical components, the surest hallmarks of difference 
in the transient half-world ofphenomena.260 
Suppose a chapter 13 debtor possesses a pre-petition cause of action. A plan is 
confirmed, so that, the debtor is the sole owner of it. Now suppose the debtor 
collects in cash. For ease of illustration, suppose the debtor keeps the cash under 
his mattress in distrust of the American banking system. Later, the chapter 13 plan 
goes into default, and the case is converted to chapter 7. Under section 348(±)(1), 
the cash does not belong to the chapter 7 trustee. In Bogdanov v. Laflamme (In re 
Laflamme),261 the court held otherwise. In Laflamme, the debtor had earned 
commissions prior to bankruptcy and received them after bankruptcy. No plan was 
ever confirmed, and the case converted to chapter 7. The chapter 7 trustee sued the 
debtor for the proceeds of her pre-petition work. 
The Laflamme court held for the trustee. It reasoned that proceeds were 
property of the estate under section 541(a)(6), which provides that the bankruptcy 
estate in any chapter includes "[p]roceeds ... except such as are earnings from 
serviced performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case. "262 
Since these commissions were earned before the commencement of the case, the 
proceeds were part of the bankruptcy estate under section 541(a)(6). But, so what? 
These proceeds, admittedly covered by section 541(a)(6), were not "property of the 
estate, as of the date of filing of the petition, that remains in the possession of . . . 
the debtor on the date of conversion."263 As of the date of the petition, property of 
the estate was the obligation of the employer to pay. After the petition, the property 
was cash. The cash did not exist as estate property, historically, at the time of the 
bankruptcy petition.264 So, it should not have been property of the estate in chapter 
7_265 
258 U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (2005). 
259 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of Section 547 of the Code, 17 
Hous. L. REv. 289, 325-26 (1980). 
260 New Article 9 has better metaphysics. According to new section 9-315(a)(2), a security interest does not 
continue into, but attaches to, proceeds. See U.C.C. § 9-315. 
261 397 B.R. 194 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2008). 
262 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2006). 
263 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(l)(A) (2006). 
264 In re Laflamme, 397 B.R. at 200. The court went on to hold that the debtor was entitled to use the 
proceeds without court permission for ordinary living expenses. Beyond that, the debtor would have to 
account to the chapter 7 trustee for the commissions. 
265 Cf In re Wiczek-Spaulding, 223 B.R. 538, 541 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1998) (holding post-petition proceeds 
of exempt property must be valued as of time proceeds came into existence, not time of bankruptcy petition 
pursuant to section 522(a)(2)). 
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C. Bad Faith Conversions 
If and when a chapter 13 case converts to chapter 7, section 348(f)(l) reserves 
for chapter 13 debtors all property acquired after the bankruptcy petition. But 
section 348(f)(2) provides a different rule if a debtor converts to chapter 7 in bad 
faith. 
Section 348(f), enacted in 1994, was designed to overrule In re Lybrook,266 
where chapter 13 debtors, more than 180 days after bankruptcy, but before a plan 
was confirmed, inherited property and converted the case to chapter 7 in the hope of 
keeping the inheritance away from the creditors. The Lybrook court ruled that 
property in the chapter 7 cases included post-petition acquisitions by the debtor. 
Congress responded by awarding post-petition property to debtors in section 
348(f)(l). But, it also enacted section 348(f)(2), where conversions are in bad faith. 
According to section 348(f)(2): "[i]f the debtor converts a case under chapter 13 of 
this title to a case under another chapter under this title in bad faith, the property of 
the estate in the converted case shall consist of the property of the estate as of the 
date of conversion. "267 If I am right about the chapter 13 estate, subsection (f)(2) is 
very limited in scope. The only thing that the chapter 7 trustee receives from the 
bad faith debtor is "property of the estate as of the date of conversion." Since, after 
confirmation, the bankruptcy estate consists of funds actually in possession of the 
chapter 13 trustee, a bad faith conversion conveys at best only this modest amount 
into chapter 7.268 Confirmation of the plan conveys all other property of the estate to 
the debtor personally. None of the bad faith debtor's property goes to the chapter 7 
trustee under this provision. 
For those who have read this far and still insist upon the plain meaning of the 
Bankruptcy Code, it is possible to maintain that bad faith debtors are actually better 
off than good faith debtors. Suppose a chapter 13 debtor owns a house. A plan is 
confirmed. The house belongs absolutely to the debtor. Since the house was 
historically property of the estate, a good faith debtor sacrifices the house to the 
chapter 7 trustee.269 A bad faith debtor does not, as the house is the debtor's own 
266 See Lybrook v. Robb (In re Lybrook), 951 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1991) ("There was a Chapter 13 
estate, it included the inheritance, and it continued intact into Chapter 7 upon conversion.") 
267 11 u.s.c. § 348(f)(2). 
268 See In re Siegfried, 219 B.R. 581, 584 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) ("[I]f the bad faith conversion is done 
prior to confirmation, any property in the hands of the Chapter 13, Trustee and, potentially, any property 
acquired by debtor during the pendancy of the Chapter 13, will become property of the Chapter 7 estate."). 
According to section 1326(c), the trustee is commanded to distribute these funds to the creditors pursuant to 
theJ1an. The Siegfried court implies that section 348(f)(2) overrides this command. 
2 In In re Salas, No. 2:05-cv-1107-GEB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85686 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2006), the 
court ruled that post-petition appreciation somehow remained with the debtor. The chapter 7 trustee was 
stuck with the valuation of the house in the chapter 13 plan pursuant to the "best interest of the creditors" 
test. This holding is dubious. The house was valued as part of a test to determine how much minimal 
disposable income ( or other finding) was required to justify confirmation of the plan . Since home mortgages 
cannot be crammed down, there was no bifurcation of an undersecured creditor involved. Rather, there was 
simply the equity in the house (in light of an unmodified mortgage). This "thing" should have been 
,-. - -- - ---
2009] THE CHAPTER 13 ESTATE 283 
property, not property of the estate at the time of conversion. Section 348(f)(2) only 
submits property of the estate at conversion to the chapter 7 process. 
Must this interpretation be accepted? Alternatively, one might say that section 
348(f)(l)(A) applies to good faith and bad faith cases alike, but that the rule of 
section 348(f)(2) supplements the· chapter 7 estate in bad faith cases. Thus, the 
house of the bad faith debtor goes to the chapter 7 trustee under section 
348(f)(l)(A). Section 348(f)(2) adds that any post-confirmation funds held by the 
chapter 13 trustee also go into chapter 7 in a bad faith case. The trouble with this 
argument, based on supplementation, is the popular "knew how to" canon of 
interpretation.27° Congress knew how to supplement the bankruptcy estate in section 
1306(a) by expressly adding property to what section 541(a) already provides. But, 
in section 348(f)(2), there is no evidence of supplementation-only displacement. 
Therefore, Congress must have intended the little absurdity that I have described in 
converted chapter 7 cases. Nevertheless, the result is absurd. Absurdity is a license 
to ignore the Bankruptcy Code, 271 and courts should have no trouble ruling that 
section 348(f)(2) cannot be read to displace section 348(f)(l)(A). Rather, the two 
statutes should be read together so that bad faith debtors not to receive a better 
housing deal than honest debtors. Can it be doubted Congress intended otherwise? 
What, then, is bad faith, for the purposes of section 348(f)(2)? In Lybrook, 
chapter 13 debtors converted to chapter 7 hoping to keep an inheritance away from 
the creditors. Was this bad faith? The Lybrook court intimated as much:. 
We are more impressed by the bankruptcy judge's observation 
that a rule of once in, always in is necessary to discourage strategic, 
opportunistic behavior that hurts creditors without advancing any 
legitimate interest of debtors. A debtor who lacks confidence that 
he can actually work his way out of his financial hole by payments 
under a Chapter 13 plan will nevertheless have an incentive to 
proceed under that chapter for as long as he can, holding his 
creditors at bay and thus staving off the evil day when they seize 
his asserts. For he knows that if his position deteriorates further it 
is the creditors who will bear the loss, while if he should get lucky 
and win a lottery or a legal judgment, or inherit money ( after 180 
days have passed since the filing of the petition), he will be able to 
keep his windfall by the simple expedient of converting to Chapter 
transferred to the chapter 7 trustee, with no reference to value at all. In any case, BAPCPA clearly changes 
the result. Today, section 348(f)(l)(B) states that when cases convert from chapter 13 to chapter 7, valuations 
in chapter 13 are to be revisited. 
270 See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 
517 n.259 (1988). 
271 See Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) ("In such cases we have followed their 
plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond 
the words to the purpose of the act."). 
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7-and remember that the debtor can convert to that chapter from 
Chapter 13 at will. 272 · 
But, in overruling Lybrook, Congress seemed to disagree. According to 
Congressman Jack Brooks: 
This amendment overrules the holding in cases such as Matter 
of Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991) . . . . However, it also 
gives the court discretion, in a case in which the debtor has abused 
the right to convert and [has] converted in bad faith, to order that all 
property held at the time of conversion shall constitute property of 
the estate in the converted case.273 
The legislative history of section 348(f)(2), therefore, suggests that converting a 
case (prior to confirmation) to save an inheritance is not bad faith. 
There is a good argument for this, beyond the legislative history. First, chapter 
13 permits debtors to keep non-income assets (i.e., principal), 274 but requires them 
to surrender disposable income. 275 Inheritance is income, if obtained after 
confirmation of the plan.276 Lybrook involved a pre-confirmation inheritance. 
Accordingly, the inheritance would be included in the "best interest of the creditors" 
test, if a plan were to be confirmed. The Lybrooks, therefore, could buy back the 
inheritance by paying a great deal of disposable income ( and, failing that, 
liquidating assets to make up the deficit).277 Instead of buying, they sought to 
convert to chapter 7, where they could have the inheritance for free. Yet, even this 
is not bad faith, according to Congress. How then is it bad faith for a debtor to 
convert the case after confirmation? After confirmation, the inheritance is no longer 
property of the estate and therefore section 348(f)(2) is absolutely incapable of 
conveying the inheritance to the chapter 7 trustee. 
In Smith v. Scales Express, Inc.,278 a debtor filed for chapter 13 and was in an 
auto accident two weeks later. The case converted to chapter 7. The defendant in 
the auto accident argued that, since the debtor did not list this cause of action on 
bankruptcy schedules, it must not exist-a judicial estoppel argument. The court 
ruled that converting to chapter 7 was not in bad faith. Therefore, the tort action 
was not property of the chapter 7 estate and need not be disclosed. But the court did 
not rule that converting auto accident victims are always in good faith. The court 
272 951 F.2d at 137-38. 
273 140 CONG. REc. Hl0,752 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Brooks). 
274 See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2006). 
275 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(l) (2006). 
276 See supra text accompanying notes 79-85. 
277 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8) (permitting plan to "provide for the payment of all or part ofa claim against 
the debtor from property of the estate or property of the debtor"). 
278 No. 05-331-BH-B, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53638 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 2, 2006). 
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took care to note that the debtor converted because he was unable to work, thanks to 
injuries sustained. 
The tort cause of action is rather like the inheritance. It is capricious post-
petition property that should not go to the chapter 7 trustee, even if the debtor, on 
his bed of pain, is motivated to keep the judgment away from the pre-petition 
creditors.279 The desire to keep assets away from creditors cannot be what "bad 
faith" means. 
Another feature of section 348(±)(2) to be emphasized is that it applies only 
when the debtor converts the case. When the chapter 13 trustee moves to convert 
the case, section 348(±)(2) is irrelevant. In U.S. Trustee v. Bostick (In re Bostick),280 
the debtor filed for chapter 13 and won the lottery four days later. The debtor then 
dissipated much of the winnings in a wild spending spree. Before any plan was 
confirmed, the chapter 13 trustee moved to convert the case. In chapter 7, the 
United States trustee sought to deny a discharge under section 727(a)(2)(B) because 
the debtor ha:d dissipated the bankruptcy estate. But in fact, the lottery winnings 
were not part of the chapter 7 estate under section 348(±)(1); section 548(±)(2) could 
not apply because the debtor was not the instigator of the conversion. 
This raises the general question of revenge in chapter 7 for actions taken in 
chapter 13 prior to the conversion. Many courts, overlooking the fine point made in 
Bostick, hold that a debtor might be denied a chapter 7 discharge for chapter 13 
misbehavior.281 But, sometimes revenge is exacted on a bad theory of the chapter 13 
estate. In Baker v. Rank (In re Baker),282 the debtors earned a legal fee after a 
chapter 13 plan was confirmed. Properly, this money was the debtors' own 
property, as the bankruptcy estate terminated when the plan was confirmed. True, 
the fee was disposable income, but the plan did not anticipate it and did not require 
that it be paid to the chapter 13 trustee. In any case, the debtors used the fee to 
finance a vacation to Asia. Later, the debtors converted the case to chapter 7. The 
trustee sought to deny the debtors a discharge for dissipating the chapter 13 estate. 
Under the 1994 amendments, section 348(f)(l)(A) would have precluded the 
notion that the debtors were dissipating what would become property of the chapter 
7 estate. But, the Baker case was not subject to the 1994 amendments. The Fifth 
Circuit thought it had to choose between two views: the Lybrook view and the view 
of Bobroff v. Continental Bank (In re Bobrojj),283 which presciently anticipated 
section 348(f)(l)(A). Even though Congress had ratified Bobroff and renounced 
279 See In re Bejarano, 302 B.R. 559, 563 (Barna. N.D. Ohio 2003); In re Wiczek-Spaulding, 223 B.R. 538, 
540 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1998) ("[S]imply taking advantage of what ... [section 348(f)(l)] provides does not 
by itself amount to bad faith."). 
280 400 B.R. 348 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009). 
281 See In re Standiford, No. 7-00-16958 MA, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4024, at *24-25 (Barna. D. N.M. 
Dec. I 7, 2008). 
282 154 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 1998). 
283 766 F.2d 797, 804 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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Lybrook,284 the Fifth Circuit thought Lybrook better represented the law prior to 
1994. In fact, the choice was an unnecessary one. Lybrook involved a pre-
confirmation conversion. Baker involved a post-confirmation conversion. As such, 
section 1327(b) terminated the bankruptcy estate, which meant that the Bakers 
committed no wrong in visiting the pleasure domes of Xanadu. The Baker result 
makes sense only if section 1306(a) cancels section 1327(b) altogether. 
It has been suggested that Baker is overruled by the 1994 amendments.285 This 
may be so, depending on what section 727(a)(2)(B) means. This provision requires 
the denial of a discharge for transferring "property of the estate, after the date of the 
filing of the petition .... "286 If "property of the estate" means "property of this 
particular chapter 7 case"-if it does not mean "property of the estate in the 
historically concluded chapter 13 case"-then Baker is overruled and post-
confirmation vacations are rightful. But if we combine the view that section 
1327(b) does not terminate the bankruptcy estate, and if section 727(a)(2)(B) refers 
to "property of the estate in the now concluded chapter 13 case," Baker still lives 
and reigns, though it badly theorizes the chapter 13 estate. 287 
Must the bad faith relate to the decision to convert, or may bad faith unrelated 
to the conversion trigger the penalty in section 348(f)(2)? Courts seem to think that 
any badness from the chapter 13 era justifies expanding the bankruptcy estate. 288 
In Uyss v. Fobber (In re Fobber),289 the debtors started in chapter 7, but 
converted to a chapter 13. Once there, they purported to sell a valuable tractor in 
the pre-confirmation period and without court permission. The proceeds were used 
to pay creditors. On motion of the chapter 13 trustee, the case was converted back 
to chapter 7, where the debtors received a discharge.290 Because the debtors did not 
themselves move to convert to chapter 7, section 348(f)(2) did not apply. 
The chapter 7 trustee sought to revoke the discharge because, pursuant to 
section 727(d)(2), "the debtor acquired property ... of the estate, or became entitled 
to acquire property that would be property of the estate, and knowingly and 
fraudulently failed to report the acquisition of or entitlement to such property, or to 
284 See generally H.R. REP. No. 103-834, at 42-43 (1994); 140 CONG. REC. Hl0,752-02 (daily ed. May 18, 
1994); 140 CONG. REC. Hl0,070-71 (daily ed. May 12, 1994). · 
285 See U.S. Trustee v. Standiford (In re Standiford); No. 7-00-16958 MA, 2008 Banla. LEXIS 4024, at 
*13-14 (Banla. D. N.M. Dec. 17, 2008); In re Frausto, 259 B.R. 201,209 (Banlcr. N.D. Ala. 2000). 
286 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
287 In Standiferd, the debtors failed to report profits as the confirmation order required. This justified a 
denial of a discharge under section 727(a)(2), which punishes dissipation of the bankruptcy estate. But, as 
the profits were realized after confirmation of the plan, such a holding assumes that section 1327(b) is wiped 
out by section 1306(a). There is also the issue of whether a court has jurisdiction to impose extra 
requirements on chapter 13 debtors not required by the Bankruptcy Code through the use of confirmation 
orders. But that issue must be left for another day. See In re Standiferd, 2008 Banla. LEXIS 4024, at **11-
12. 
288 See In re Siegfried, 219 B.R. 581, 585 (Banla. D. Colo. 1998) (failure regarding disclosure of debts and 
"eleventh-hour conversion" to avoid hearing amounted to bad faith). 
289 256 B.R. 268 (Banla. E.D. Tenn. 2000), af/'d mem., 202 F.3d 268 (6th Cir. 1999). 
29
° Fobber v. Wyss (In re Fobber), No. 99-5302, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34019, *3 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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deliver or surrender such property to the trustee .... 11291 
A couple of points about this influential case may be made. First, the debtors 
sold the pre-petition tractor without court permission, which is required under 
section 363(b ). Properly, the sale is void, and the trustee can simply get the tractor 
from the buyer by bringing a turnover proceeding under section 542(a).292 The 
buyer might then sue the debtors for breach of warranty of title.293 Nevertheless, the 
issue is whether the debtors both acquired property of the estate and then 
fraudulently failed to deliver or surrender "property of the estate." 
The first requirement of section 727( d)(2) is that the debtors acquire property of 
the estate. Arguably, the tractor was acquired by the debtors when they converted 
their chapter 7 case to chapter 13. In chapter 7, the debtors had de facto possession 
of the tractor, but the trustee was entitled to use, sell, or lease it with court 
permission. In chapter 13, the debtors "acquired" the trustee's right to use, sell, or 
lease.294 
Later, the debtor "acquired" cash from the alleged buyer of the tractor. Was this 
cash property of the estate in either chapter 13 or the reconverted chapter 7 case? 
The court thought so,295 but, it left out an analytical step. The tractor was still 
property of the estate because the debtors had no authority to sell it. If so, the cash 
received was not proceeds of the tractor. The chapter 7 trustee cannot have both the 
tractor and the cash. Nevertheless, it is open for the bankruptcy court to ratify the 
debtors' illegal sale. If so, the buyer obtains good title to the tractor, and the debtors 
become the constructive trustees of the cash received for the benefit of the chapter 7 
estate. On this theory of ratifying an unauthorized sale, the question of acquisition 
can be decided in favor of the chapter 7 trustee. The element of "knowingly and 
fraudulently failed . . . to deliver" property of the estate, however, becomes 
problematic if the trustee ratifies what the debtor did in order to create a 
constructive trust in the proceeds. 
Another hard issue is whether the debtors failed to deliver property of the 
estate. Under section 348(f)(l)(A), only property that was in the chapter 7 estate at 
the time of the bankruptcy petition that the debtor still possesses is property of the 
converted chapter 7 case. Since the tractor (and proceeds of the tractor) were gone 
by the time of conversion,296 the debtors cannot be found guilty of failing to deliver 
property of the chapter 7 estate. 
The Fobber court thought that the illegal sale of the tractor and subsequent 
291 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2). 
292 The trustee need not "avoid" the transfer under section 549(a) because the debtors had no title to give, 
without court permission. See In re Fobber, 256 B.R. at 271-73. The point makes a difference, as section 
549(d) has a statute oflimitations that is not applicable to turnover actions under section 542(a). 
293 See UCC § 2-312(1 )(b) (requiring seller to warrant goods as free of any interest, lien, or encumbrance). 
294 See 11 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006). 
295 See In re Fobber, 256 B.R. at 275-76, 278. 
296 See id. at 271, 274. The bad faith rule of section 348(f)(2) cannot apply, here, because that rule is 
invoked only when the debtor converts the case in bad faith. See infra text accompanying notes 265-297. 
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disposition of the proceeds should be punished by revocation of the chapter 7 
discharge. But it could not really reconcile the result with section 348(:t)(l)(A): 
"this court is convinced that § 348(:t) was never designed to be a safe harbor for 
debtors who fraudulently and surreptitiously dispose of property of the estate with 
in chapter 13. As such, this court holds that § 348(:t) is inapplicable to the facts of 
the present case. "297 
What does it mean that section 348(:t) does not apply? Presumably, it means 
that the law prior to the 1994 amendments applies. And, what is that? Courts were 
split between the view of the future section 348(:t) and the Lybrook view. 
Obviously, the court surreptitiously chose the Lybrook view, under which the 
debtors did indeed fail to deliver property of what should have been the chapter 7 
estate. 
D. Administrative Priority 
One consequence of the proper theory of the chapter 13 estate is that, in a 
converted case, a post-petition creditor of the debtor cannot claim to be an 
administrative creditor. Rather, such a creditor is treated as a pre-petition creditor 
under section 348(d).298 An administrative claim must comply with section 503(b), 
which requires that a claim be for "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of 
preserving the estate .... "299 This, a post-petition creditor could not show simply 
because there is no bankruptcy estate to preserve. 300 
Under the DT, the only chapter 13 estate after confirmation is the funds 
successfully transmitted from the debtor to the chapter 13 trustee. Typically, a 
provider of credit to the post-confirmation debtor is not helping to preserve these 
funds. To be sure, the post-confirmation creditor is perhaps helping to make post-
confirmation income possible, but that is not good enough. Such a contribution 
does not preserve the estate. Arguably, it helps to create the bankruptcy estate. But, 
section 503(b )( 1 )(A) insists on preservation. 
297 In re Fobber, 256 B.R. at 279. 
298 According to this provision: 
A claim against the estate or the debtor that arises after the order for relief but before 
conversion in a case that is converted under section ... 1307 of this title, other than a 
claim specified in section 503(b) of this title, shall be treated for all purposes as if such 
claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of the petition. 
11 U.S.C. 348(d) (2006). 
299 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2006). 
30° Cf. In re Frausto, 259 B.R. 201, 205 n.7 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2000) ("Econolube did not prove that there 
was a bankruptcy estate that these costs preserved."); In re Gyulafia, 65 B.R. 913, 916-17 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
1986) ("At confirmation, all the property of the estate is vested in the debtor, thereby terminating the estate's 
existence, although the court has continued jurisdiction ... to oversee the plan's execution." ( quoting In re 
Westholt Mfg. Inc., 20 B.R. 368,372 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982))). 
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In Security Bank v. Neiman,301 hog farmers filed in chapter 13. A plan was 
confirmed, and a veterinarian tended to the hogs, patiently nursing them to porcine 
salubrity. The case converted to chapter 7 and the hogs went into the Galilee of the 
chapter 7 estate. The veterinarian's claim was allowed as an administrative claim. 
True, when the veterinarian performed the service, the hogs had been transferred to 
the debtor. The Eighth Circuit decided, however, that the hogs were always 
property of the estate. It followed the view that the bankruptcy estate does not end 
with confirmation of a chapter 13 plan. This got them to where they wanted to be: 
the veterinarian was an administrative creditor in the chapter 7 case. But, such a 
view deletes section 1327(b) from the Bankruptcy Code and cannot be supported. 
The idea that post-confirmation claims can be administrative in nature is refuted 
by section 1305(a)(2), which provides that post-petition consumer debts can be 
allowed if they are "for property or services necessary for the debtor's performance 
under the plan."302 Does not this provision preempt any notion that post-petition 
claims can also be allowed as administrative claims? It would seem that either 
post-petition creditors qualify under section 1305(a)(2) for plan treatment or not at 
all. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have defended the so-called "estate transformation" theory of 
the chapter 13 estate. I have renamed it the "Divestment Theory." According to the 
DT, all assets of the chapter 13 estate are transferred to the debtor upon 
confirmation of the plan. A chapter 13 estate exists thereafter only to the extent the 
debtor successfully conveys plan payments to the chapter 13 estate. Courts 
frequently reject the DT. First, they find a way to read section 1327(b) out of the 
Bankruptcy Code. According to section 1327(b), "the confirmation of a plan vests 
all of the property of the estate in the debtor." Some courts claim the word "vest" 
does not mean "transfer absolutely." This is done to exalt section 1306(a), which 
states that all the debtor's post-petition acquisitions are in the chapter 13 estate until 
the case is "closed, dismissed or converted." Since confirmation does not close the 
case, confirmation must not terminate the chapter 13 estate. Other courts admit that 
section 1327(b) terminates the chapter 13 estate as it existed on the day the plan was 
confirmed, but section 1306(a) still works to sweep in the debtor's post-
confirmation acquisitions. This is done in order to honor the words of both section 
1306(a) and section 1327(b). 
Under the theory I have defended, to "vest" means to transfer absolutely. I have 
presented strong textual evidence that this is so. Section 1327(b), therefore, 
overrules section 1306(a), but retains some utility for this provision by limiting its 
effect to the pre-confirmation period. The DT, though it requires the view that a 
301 1 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1993). 
302 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(2) (2006); see supra text accompanying notes 265-94. 
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specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code overrules a more general provision, is 
the one that does least damage to the text of the Bankruptcy Code and accords with 
well-accepted canons of statutory interpretation. 
